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Abstract
The implementation of network security protocols has not received the same level of attention in
the literature as their analysis. Security protocol analysis has successfully used inference logics, like
GNY and BAN, and attack analysis, employing state space examination techniques such as model
checking and strand spaces, to verify security protocols. Tools, such as the multi-dimensional anal-
ysis environment SPEAR II, exist to help automate security protocol specification and verification,
however actual implementation of the specification in executable code is a task still largely left to
human programmers. Many vulnerabilities have been found in implementations of security protocols
such as SSL, PPTP and RADIUS that are incorporated into widely used operating system software,
web servers and other network aware applications. While some of these vulnerabilities may be a re-
sult of flawed or unclear specifications, many are the result of the failure of programmers to correctly
interpret and implement them.
The above indicates a gap between security protocol specifications and their concrete implemen-
tations, in that there are methodologies and tools that have been established for developing the
former, but not the latter. This dissertation proposes an approach to bridging this gap, describes
our implementation of that approach and attempts to evaluate its success.
The approach is three-fold, providing different measures to improve current ad-hoc implementation
approaches:
1. From Informal to Formal Specifications: If a security protocol has been specified us-
ing informal standard notation, it can be converted, using automatic translation, to a formal
specification language with well defined semantics. The formal protocol specification can then
be analysed using formal techniques, to verify that the desired security properties hold. The
precise specification of the protocol behaviour further serves to facilitate the concrete imple-
mentation of the protocol in code.
2. Separate Implementation Concerns: When implementing security protocols, the what
and the when of protocol actions are abstracted from the how. That is, protocol logic imple-
mentation concerns, such as when and what actions should be performed on messages, should
be clearly and cleanly separated from the cryptographic and network communication imple-
mentation details that implement how the actions are performed. Such high level modularity
allows code implementing protocol logic to be re-used with different cryptographic algorithm
implementations and network communication protocols. It also allows errors in the imple-
mentation of the cryptography to be addressed by swapping cryptographic implementations
without changing the protocol logic code. The abstraction of cryptographic and network im-
plementation is analogous to the adoption of the Dolev-Yao style models by many analysis
techniques, where the cryptography itself is viewed as a black box and assumed perfect, allow-
ing the analysis to focus on the protocol logic. Finally, this separation allows the correctness
of the protocol logic implementation and cryptographic primitives implementation to be ad-
dressed separately.
3. Automated Implementation Using Code Generation We use code generation to au-
tomate the security protocol implementation process, avoiding the risk of human error in
interpreting the sometimes subtle semantics of security protocol specifications. The precise
nature of formal specification languages provides a base from which to specify and implement
an automatic code generation tool. Our approach follows requirements identified for high in-
tegrity code generation - where feasible - to give a high level of confidence in the correctness
of the generated code.
In implementing the approach, we adopt the Spi Calculus for the role of formal specification lan-
guage. The Spi Calculus was developed by extending the pi-calculus, a process algebra for describing
concurrent communicating systems, to cater for the special case of network security protocols. Spi
Calculus specifications can be analysed manually, by developing correctness proofs by hand, and
automatically, by using model checkers such as MMC. As Spi Calculus specifications explicitly de-
scribe the actions of a security protocol, they are also particularly suitable for use as input for code
generation. The implementation of the approach is split across three components that correspond
to each of the parts of the approach:
1. Sn2Spi is a translator that converts an informal standard notation specification to a Spi
Calculus specification, thus implementing part 1 of our approach. The converted specification
can be analysed using any of the formal techniques applicable to the Spi Calculus. Once
verified, the specification can be used to generate a concrete implementation using Spi2Java.
2. The Security Protocol Primitives API abstracts cryptographic and network communi-
cation operations, decoupling code that implements protocol logic from code that implements
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cryptographic and network operations. It provides the basic cryptographic and network com-
munications functionality required to implement a security protocol, including: symmetric and
asymmetric encryption, message digest, nonce and timestamp generation, marshalling message
component data and sending and receiving messages over a network. A provider model, much
like that used in the Java Cryptography Extensions API, is employed to allow different imple-
mentations to be swapped without changing the SPP client code.
3. Spi2Java is a code generator, essentially implementing a compiler from the Spi Calculus to
Java code. Spi2Java uses Prolog to implement a defined mapping from Spi Calculus constructs,
i.e. terms and process actions, to Java code segments. These code segments call the SPP API to
access cryptographic and network functionality where needed. The mapping was developed by
refining Spi constructs to Java code segments that preserve the semantics of the Spi constructs.
In addition, assertions are made in the code segments to ensure certain conditions are met
before the implementation can continue running.
Part of evaluating the effectiveness of this automated approach to security protocol implementation,
involved a case study where manual implementations of the CCITT Three Message X.509 Proto-
col, developed by 4th year Computer Science students, and a Spi2Java generated implementation
are compared. The outcome of the study favoured the automatically generated implementation,
indicating the potential of the approach.
Further to demonstrating the utility of code generation, we describe an SPP provider implementation
developed to allow a security protocol run, including legitimate and attacker roles, to be simulated
in a controlled environment. Spi2Java allows the protocol engineer to quickly and automatically
generate code for protocol roles. The code can be executed using this implementation allowing the
protocol engineer to step through execution of all roles, both legitimate and attacker, to gain insight
into the behaviour of the protocol.
The approach is evaluated in terms of the class of attacks it prevents and how it meets the identified
requirements for high integrity code generation. It is also compared to existing and current work
in the field. Attack classes that exploit faulty protocol logic implementation, vulnerability to type
flaws and buffer overflows are prevented. The Spi2Java code generator fully meets three of the five
high integrity code generation requirements: formally defined source and target languages are used;
the translation software is validated; and the generated code is well structured and documented and
can be traced back to the specification. Spi2Java partially meets the requirement that the mapping
from source to target language constructs be formally proven to preserve the specification semantics.
However the arguments given are not strictly formal. The requirement related to rigorous testing
are not met due to practical resource constraints. However, Spi2Java has been used to generate real
world protocol implementations that have been verified by manual inspection.
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Sprite, incorporating the Sn2Spi translator and Spi2Java code generator, provides a structured
approach to network security protocol implementation by implementing automated translation from
informal to formal security protocol specifications, and by being able to automatically generate Java
implementations of network security protocols in which the security protocol engineer can have a
high degree of confidence.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Network security protocols provide a mechanism to communicate securely over public networks, such
as the internet, facilitating electronic commerce, personal and business interactions and other com-
munications and transactions that require some level of security. The aim of a security protocol is to
provide the required combination of the general security properties: Authentication, Confidentiality
and Integrity or their specialisations: Authorisation and Non-repudiation.
Security protocols specify rules to achieve secure communication. These rules describe a sequence
of messages - the message flow, including content and format of the messages and cryptographic
operations, that when followed successfully result in some security outcome, e.g. the authentication
of a principal (a legitimate party in a security protocol) or the establishment of a channel allowing
private communication between multiple principals. Because cryptography is used to achieve secu-
rity, the terms security protocol and cryptographic protocol are often used interchangeably. We shall
use the term “security protocol”, or sometimes just “protocol” when the context is clear, throughout
this dissertation.
Research in security protocol engineering has focused primarily on the analysis of security protocol
specifications for correctness: that is determining whether or not the intended security properties of
a protocol actually do hold. In the next section we elaborate on this, and develop the motivation
for this thesis, which aims to address the fact that there has been little research into the correct
implementation of security protocols.
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1.1 Motivation
The purpose of security protocol analysis is to verify that the intended security properties of the
protocol hold and cannot be subverted by either an active or passive attack on the protocol. Formal
and semi-formal methods have been successfully used in security protocol analysis [41, 37, 39, 1, 61]:
• Static analysis using inference logics, such as BAN [41] and GNY [37], allow the protocol
engineer to reason about the beliefs of the principals participating in a run of a security
protocol. Tools such as SPEAR II [55], provide a user-friendly graphical environment for
security protocol engineering and analysis. They allow the engineer to specify a security
protocol and the intended possessions and beliefs that the principals should have at the end
of a successful protocol run. The automatic analysis capability of SPEAR II uses the initial
possessions and beliefs of the participants as given facts which, in conjunction with the inference
rules of GNY, allow it to determine what valid beliefs the participants may hold at the end of
the run.
• Dynamic analysis, using techniques such as model checking and strand space analysis to explore
and reason about the state space of possible protocol runs, has revealed ways to actively
subvert a protocol, such as man in the middle and parallel session style attacks. Tools like
Casper/FDR [40], CAPSL/Maude [20] and MMC [54] implement model checking techniques
by analyzing security protocols, specified in a suitable formal language, to determine whether
certain properties hold. This approach has been particularly successful; revealing flaws, such
as discovered by Lowe in the Needham Schroeder protocol [40], in protocols that for years were
assumed to be secure.
The same emphasis has not, however, been placed on the correctness of security protocol implemen-
tation. Although methodologies and tools, such as those mentioned above, exist to help design and
analyze security protocols, the concrete implementation in code is a task still largely left to human
programmers. As with the implementation of concurrent communicating systems in general, there
is significant scope for introduction of errors by human programmers. This is compounded by the
fact that the semantics of security protocol specifications are often subtle, small deviations in the
implementation from the specification can dramatically effect the actual security properties of the
protocol.
The potential for implementation error is evident in the number of security alerts issued for imple-
mentations of various security protocols used by software such as web servers, web browsers and
operating system components relied on by network aware applications. Flaws have been discovered
in many software vendors’ SSL implementations in the last year alone, including, but not limited
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to, companies such as Apple, SCO, Microsoft, Cisco, and RSA, as well as open source organisations
such as OpenSSL, KDE and Apache [11, 13, 36, 12].
It is clear then, that although security protocol engineering has been successful in producing cor-
rect specifications, it has been less so in producing correct implementations. This is arguably a
general software development problem, but because it is of special significance to security software
components, this discourse is limited to security protocols.
Our survey of the literature, when beginning this work, revealed few well defined methods, and - at
the time - no available tools for implementing security protocols, indicating a gap between security
protocol specification and implementation. This gap provides the motivation for this work.
1.2 Objective and Requirements
The aim of this work is to bridge the gap between security protocol specification and implementation.
We define a structured approach to security protocol implementation, involving software tools for
automated translation of specifications and code generation.
To achieve the objective, we define it in terms of the following requirements that our work must
meet:
1. It must have the ability to automatically translate informal to formal specifications,
2. be able to automatically generate security protocol implementations from formal specifications
and provide a high level of confidence in those implementations and
3. must realise a well defined methodology and tools for security protocol implementation, which
are easily usable by the security protocol engineer.
1.3 Evaluation Criteria
To evaluate our approach, and specifically its software components, we need to determine to what
extent it meets the requirements listed above.
Whether our work meets the first and third requirements can be judged directly. However to
evaluate the work against the second, and key, requirement, an independently defined set of criteria
is necessary. We will use the requirements for high integrity code generation, identified in [64], to
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evaluate our work with respect to meeting the second requirement. We introduce, summarise and
discuss these requirements for high integrity code generation in chapter 2.3.
1.4 Scope and Limitations
Research by Backes et al [44] has shown that concrete cryptographic libraries can correctly imple-
ment an idealised cryptographic model, such as that proposed by Dolev and Yao in [24]. We thus
limit the scope of this work by not addressing the issues associated with correctly implementing
cryptographic primitives. Instead we will focus on the correctness of the generated code that imple-
ments the protocol logic, i.e. the code that determines when and what actions are performed by the
protocol implementation.
Similarly, we do not address the correctness of the implementation of network communication op-
erations. We do, however, use widely adopted and tested cryptographic and network libraries to
implement these functions.
1.5 Approach
To achieve the objective and meet the requirements, we propose a high level approach in which the
following are advocated:
• Formal Specification: Use a suitable formal language for specifying security protocols. This
language must be suitable for both protocol analysis techniques and as a basis for implemen-
tation, to avoid translation between multiple specification languages.
• Automated Specification Translation: Automatically translate any informal specifications
in standard notation to the adopted formal language.
• Separate Implementation Aspects: Separate the code that implements the protocol ac-
tions from the code that implements the cryptographic algorithms and communications oper-
ations.
• Automated Implementation: Automatic code generation that generates an executable
implementation from a formal specification.
In implementing this approach we use the Spi Calculus as the formal specification language; develop
a translation utility Sn2Spi to convert informal standard notation specifications to Spi Calculus
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specification; define and implement the Security Protocol Primitives API to allow cryptographic
primitives and network communication operations to be de-coupled the protocol logic implementa-
tion; and implement Spi2Java, an automated code generation tool that generates Java code from
Spi Calculus specifications.
1.6 Dissertation Outline
This layout of this disseration is as follows:
• In chapter 2 we introduce and provide some background on security protocol engineering,
introduce and evaluate specification languages that can be used in that process, and look at
requirements for high integrity code generation.
• Chapter 3 introduces the formal specification language we will use in this work, the Spi Cal-
culus, and describes some modifications we have made to it to make it suitable for specifying
input for a code generation tool.
• The Sn2Spi tool, developed for translating informal standard notation security protocol spec-
ifications to the Spi Calculus, is described in chapter 4.
• In chapter 5 the design and development of the Security Protocol Primitives API for abstracting
cryptographic and network communications functionality is discussed and its interface defined.
• In chapter 6 we describe the core of this work, Spi2Java, a tool for generating Java code
from security protocol specifications in the Spi Calculus. We discuss the development of the
translation from Spi to Java, and the implementation of that translation in Prolog. We generate
an implementation of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol to demonstrate Spi2Java.
• We briefly cover the Security Protocol Implementation Tool and Environment (Sprite) that
provides a graphical user interface to Sn2Spi and Spi2Java, and a SPP API provider imple-
mentation that allows the simulation of security protocol runs using Spi2Java generated code,
in chapter 7.
• In chapter 8, we described a case study comparing manual implementations of simplified version
of the CCITT Three Message X.509 Protocol against an automatically generated implemen-
tation using Sn2Spi and Spi2Java. We also evaluate Spi2Java against the high integrity code
generation requirements described in chapter 2.
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• We conclude with chapter 9, by looking at how this work meets the objectives listed in this
introduction chapter, discussing limitations and possible future work and describing the con-
tributions of this work.
Chapter 2
Background
In the first section of this background chapter we discuss security protocol engineering and place this
work in that context. The second section is a survey of security protocol specification languages.
We look at the role of specification languages in security protocol engineering and develop a set of
criteria to determine their suitability for this purpose. We summarise several key languages and
evaluate them against these criteria. Finally we introduce high integrity code generation, as defined
by the requirements formulated by Whalen and Heimdahl [64], and verifiable compilers.
2.1 Security Protocol Engineering
Security protocol engineering is a specialisation of software engineering in general, with its concept
of a system development life cycle (SDLC), such as those described in [33], involving requirements
analysis, design, development and testing. In this section we describe a security protocol development
process similar to the traditional SDLC model, but with some modifications. We then place this
work in the context of this process and relative to other research, analysis techniques and tools.
We define a security protocol development process, outlined in figure 1, consisting of requirements
analysis, design and specification, implementation and implementation verification phases. The
initial software concept phase of the traditional SDLC, that identifies the need for a new system, is
skipped.
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Figure 1: Overview of the security protocol development process.
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2.1.1 Requirements Analysis
This first phase is analogous to the requirements analysis phase of the traditional SDLC model. In
this process however, the requirements of interest are specifically those related to security, i.e. the
desired security properties of the protocol. The requirements are specified in terms of the security
properties: authentication, confidentiality and/or integrity. Note that restricting requirements to
security properties in this discussion is not intended to deny that, in software development, a holistic
approach should be taken to security. Security is a totally pervasive aspect of software systems, and
cannot be addressed in isolation or (easily) implemented retro-actively.
2.1.2 Design and Specification
This phase, and the following protocol analysis phase, correspond to the design phase of the SDLC
- in which a software system that meets the requirements, is designed both logically and physically.
In this phase a security protocol specification, that attempts to meet the requirements identified in
the first phase, is developed. The specification defines the protocol’s
• message flow,
• message contents
• and the cryptographic mechanisms employed (not necessarily the specific algorithms to be used,
but rather the type of operations, e.g. symmetric or asymmetric encryption and decryption,
message digests etc.)
These are determined with the intention of endowing the security protocol specification with the
desired security properties. Security protocol flaws are often subtle, and while there are guidelines for
designing security protocols [2], there is no canonical list of rules that can be followed to guarantee a
flawless protocol design. However, there are successful analysis techniques for verifying, or revealing
flaws in, security protocol specifications. Thus this phase is coupled with the protocol analysis phase
in a feedback loop; a security protocol specification is developed, then analysed, if flaws are found
the engineer returns to the design and specification phase and repeats the process until a correct
protocol specification is developed.
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2.1.3 Protocol Analysis
The protocol specification is analysed to determine whether the security properties stated in the
requirements hold. If they don’t, the analysis results are fed back to the design and specification
phase and the protocol is modified or redesigned. If they do then the process can progress to the
implementation phase.
The output of this phase is a security protocol specification that has been verified to be correct w.r.t.
the requirements formulated in the first phase.
2.1.4 Implementation
In this phase, which corresponds to the development phase of the SDLC, the protocol specification
is implemented, either manually or by automatic code generation.
2.1.5 Implementation Verification
To avoid negating the work done verifying the protocol specification, the implementation must be
verified to ensure it correctly implements the specification. The implementation verification phase
corresponds to the testing phase of the SDLC. Unlike traditional “after the fact” testing of the
SDLC, the use of automatic code generation allows the implementation verification to be integrated
into the implementation phase. In section 2.3 we discuss how an automatic code generation tool
can be developed to meet requirements for high integrity code generation, ensuring the correctness
of the generated code. In this approach, the translation from the specification to code, and the
implementation of that translation by the code generator, are verified, obviating the need to verify
every protocol implementation generated by the automatic code generator.
The output of this phase is the output of the entire process: an executable program that conforms
to the security protocol specification that meets the identified requirements.
2.1.6 This Work in Context
The work described in this dissertation focuses on the implementation and implementation verifi-
cation phases and, to a lesser extent, relates to the design and specification and protocol analysis
phases.
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Our Spi2Java automatic code generation tool, introduced in chapter 6, forms the core of this work. It
provides an automated mechanism for the implementation and implementation verification phases,
as outlined in figure 1.
The Sn2Spi translation tool, discussed in chapter 4, converts informal specifications to formal spec-
ifications. It facilitates linking the design and specification phase to the protocol analysis phase by
allowing informal specifications, that might be developed during the design and specification phase,
to be translated to formal specifications that can be used more effectively in the protocol analysis
phase.
2.2 Security Protocol Languages
The purpose of this section is to examine the role of specification languages in the security protocol
development process described previously. We review informal security protocol specification us-
ing the standard notation, discuss why formal specification is important, show how a specification
language can facilitate the analysis and implementation phases of security protocol engineering and
then identify the properties that make a specification language suitable for these phases. With these
properties in mind, we survey a number of existing languages for security protocols. Finally we
discuss our selection of one these languages for use in this work.
2.2.1 Informal Specification Using the Standard Notation
Texts describing security protocols generally use an informal standard notation. The term “standard”
may be misleading as there are many minor syntactic variations. The standard notation specifies
security protocols at a high level of abstraction: indicating the order, direction of flow, and contents
of the protocol messages, but not the format of the message components or the exact cryptographic
algorithms used. A simple protocol, where principal A sends principal B a message consisting of her
identifier and a nonce, all encrypted with B’s public key, would be specified as:
1 A → B : {n, A}KPubB
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2.2.2 The Need for Formal Specification Languages
While intuitive, the notation above is informal. It does not explicitly state the actions necessary to
verify messages received by the principals, nor the meaning of the messages’ contents. The notation
is not precise enough for basing a formal analysis on, developing implementations from, or verifying
implementations against. Because of these shortcomings, formal languages have been developed for
specifying and analysing security protocols.
2.2.3 Specification Languages in Security Protocol Engineering
For this work, the primary role of a specification language is to specify input for a code generation
tool. However the language should have properties suitable for protocol analysis and verifying
implementations against their specifications. More generally the specification language should be
suitable for all the security protocol engineering activities to link them together, as shown in figure
2.
Design and Specification
For specification, a language needs to be intuitive as well as easily usable and understandable by the
security protocol engineer. It must also be able to precisely and unambiguously specify the behaviour
of a security protocol. Natural language definitions of protocol semantics may be intuitive, but due
to the inherent ambiguities of natural languages they may not be sufficiently precise [64]. Formally
defined semantics can provide the required precision.
Protocol Analysis
Formal languages have been used to reason about the security properties of protocols [16, 1, 40, 66,
61, 9]. A mathematically sound basis for analysis makes it possible to construct proofs showing that a
desired security property always holds, or produce counter-examples to demonstrate that the desired
security property does not hold, as in [40]. This can be done manually, or with model checkers and
analysis tools such as FDR, Isabelle/HOL, the NRL Protocol Analyzer and Maude [40, 53, 20, 9].
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Implementation
Correctly implementing a security protocol, either manually or automatically, requires an exact
specification of the protocol behaviour. As mentioned, natural language definitions may not be
sufficiently precise, so again formally defined semantics are required. To facilitate code generation,
the language’s concrete syntax should be defined to allow specification in plain text.
Implementation Verification
Even a small flaw in a security protocol implementation can result in the implementation being
insecure. The problem is compounded by the fact that implementation is often an informal pro-
cess and hence error prone. This makes it easier for inconsistencies between the specification and
implementation to arise.
The formal definition of a language’s semantics, provide a way to refine the specification to executable
code and prove that it correctly implements that specification [64].
2.2.4 Specification Language Requirements
From the discussion above we have identified the following requirements for the selection of a spec-
ification language:
1. Usable: The language must be easily usable. It should have a concise and simple abstract and
concrete syntax. An intuitive, natural language definition of the language semantics should be
defined.
2. Formal : The language must have a formally defined syntax and semantics.
3. Suitable for Analysis: The semantics of the language should be suitable for a formal analysis
of a protocol’s security properties.
4. Suitable for Verification: The semantics of the language should be suitable for verifying im-
plementations against specifications.
5. Plain Text Specifications: Specifications must be able to be written as ASCII text files for
input into automated tools.
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Figure 2: The use of a specification during analysis, implementation and verification.
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2.2.5 Survey of Security Protocol Languages
In this section we review several potentially suitable security protocol specification languages. They
are CAPSL/CIL, CPAL and the process algebras SPL and the Spi Calculus.
CAPSL and CIL
The Common Authentication Protocol Specification Language (CAPSL) was developed as a single
language to specify input to a wide range of formal analysis methods and automated tools [22]. It is
intuitive, yet formally defined. Its core syntax is similar to the standard notation and specifications
are in plain ASCII text. CAPSL specifications have a preamble to define initial assumptions and
protocol goals to be [21].
Its formal semantics are defined by its translation to the CAPSL Intermediate Language (CIL) [22],
a rewrite logic that describes the state transitions of a protocol [21]. This semantics definition is
similar to the internal representations of protocols used by many tools [20], facilitating translation
to the other languages used by these tools.
CAPSL/CIL meets most of the identified requirements. However, there are some usability drawbacks
of the combination, especially with regard to simplicity and conciseness. CAPSL has to be translated
to CIL to provide a formal specification. Doing this manually is a long and tedious task - even for a
simple protocol: the CIL definition of the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Authentication Protocol,
which involves the exchange of three messages, runs to approximately 176 lines [48]. A preliminary
automatic translator does exist, but is described as experimental and incomplete [49].
CPAL
The Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Language (CPAL) [66], makes protocol specification explicit
by, for instance, allowing assertions to be made about received messages components, having explicit
encryption and decryption operators and conditional statements such as “if-then-else” constructs.
The language semantics are defined by Dijkstra’s weakest precondition logic and is based on the
pre-condition/post-condition approach to reasoning about programs developed by Hoare [66]. This
gives CPAL the formality required to analyse security protocols, as demonstrated by the CPAL
Evaluation System (CPAL-ES) described by Yasinsac in [66]. CPAL-ES provides a method for both
static and dynamic analysis and has been used to evaluate a number of protocols, including the
Woo-Lam, Andrews Secure RPC and Needham-Schroeder Public Key protocols [66]. The use of
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CPAL appears to be quite limited.
Process Algebras: Spi Calculus and SPL
Process languages, or algebras, have been developed to facilitate the formal description and analysis
of complex, communicating systems. As security protocols are a special case of communicating
systems, process languages, e.g. CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) and the pi-calculus,
can be used to reason about their properties [40] [1]. The discovery of a flaw in the Needham-
Schroeder public key authentication protocol, cited earlier, is an example of the effectiveness of
process languages in describing and analyzing security protocols [40].
The Spi Calculus, defined by Abadi and Gordon in [1], extends the pi-calculus by adding encryption
and decryption clauses to the syntax. SPL is similar to the Spi Calculus [16], but defines fewer,
more specialised, processes. SPL uses a network communications model that is quite different from
the channels used by the Spi Calculus.
The Spi Calculus, consists of terms, such as names, variables and pairs, and some simple processes,
such as sending and receiving messages and parallel composition of processes. Each of the processes
has a simple, well defined function. Despite its small size and relative simplicity, the Spi Calculus
(and the pi-calculus it is based on) is very powerful in its ability to describe concurrent systems.
We introduce the Spi Calculus by way of an example - in which we compare an informal to a formal
specification. A full definition of the Spi Calculus is given in chapter 3 when we introduce it as our
formalism of choice for specifying security protocols.
SPL is a process language similar to the Spi Calculus. SPL has a concise syntax, defining only three
processes. These processes have more specialised and complex behaviours compared to those of the
Spi Calculus. SPL uses a message space, as opposed to channels, to model network communication.
Messages are sent by processes to the message space that represents the network. They can be read
by any other process, as described in [15]. SPL is asynchronous, in that an SPL output process does
not have to wait for a, or synchronise with, a corresponding input process to interact with in order
to send a message [15].
Assuming a set of infinite names with elements n, m, A, ..., variables x, y, ..., X, Y ... over names,
variables ψ, ψ′, ψ1, ... the syntax for SPL is defined, as it appears in [15], by the grammar:
Name expression c ::= n, A, ... |x, X, ...
Key expression k ::= Pub(v) |Priv(v) |Key(~v)
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Message expression m ::= v | k |M1, M2 | {M}k |ψ
Process expression p ::= out new~xM.p | in pat~x~ψM.p | ‖i∈I pi
The vector notation, ~x, is used to indicate a list of zero or more elements.
The behaviour of the processes is informally described, as in [15], as follows:
• out new ~xM.p selects fresh distinct names (generally nonces or keys), ~n and binds them to the
element of ~x. It then outputs the message M [~n/~x] to the network. The process p is then run.
• in pat ~x~ψM.p waits for a message to be input that matches the message pattern M for a valid
binding to the pattern variables ~x~ψ that appear in M . The process p is then run.
• ‖i∈I pi is the parallel composition process and behaves as all the components, which are
indexed by i, running in parallel. The empty parallel composition process is abbreviated as
nil, and does nothing.
Formal vs. Informal Specifications
We use the canonical Needham-Schroeder Public Key Authentication Protocol as an example to
contrast informal and formal specifications. The protocol is defined informally in the standard
notation by message flow:
1 A → B : {n, A}KPubB
2 B → A : {n, m}KPubA
3 A → B : {m}KPubB
To define the same protocol formally in the Spi Calculus, the initiator and responder roles are first
defined as processes. If A and B are terms representing the principals participating in the protocol,
N and M are nonces, KPubA and KPrivA are the public and private keys of A, KPubB and KPrivB
are the public and private keys of B and CAB is an insecure channel suitable for communication
between A and B, then the initiator can be defined as:
Init(A, KPubB , KPrivA) = (N)CAB〈{N, A}KPubB 〉.
CAB(xcipher).case xcipher of {x1, x2}KPrivA .[x1 isN ].
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CAB〈{x2}KPubB 〉.
F (X)
and the responder as:
Resp(KPubA, KPrivB) = CAB(xcipher).case xcipher of {x1, x2}KPrivB .
(M)CAB〈{y1, M}KPubA〉.
CAB(ycipher).case ycipher of {y}KPrivB .[y isM ].
G(X)
An instance of the protocol is defined as follows:
NS(A, KPubA, KPrivA, KPubB , KPrivB) =
Init(A, KPubB , KPrivA) |Resp(KPubA, KPrivB)
Although it is clear from the informal description what the contents of the messages should be, the
actions of the protocol are not explicit. For example: the informal description does not explicitly
state that the initiator, A, must check the nonce n received in message 2 against the nonce it sent
in message 1. It is also not clear when the nonces should be generated and what action to take
if the value of a received message component does not match the expected value. Though these
actions may be regarded as intuitive, this may not be the case for a more complex protocol that has
a greater number of messages and message components.
In contrast, the formal definition of the same protocol describes precisely the actions that should
be taken when sending and receiving messages. Returning to the example, the formal definition
specifies that the initiator must check that the nonce y1 received in message 2 matches the nonce n
sent in message 1. It also specifies when it should be checked and what to do (in this case halt) if
it does not match.
So although the standard notation lends itself to a quick, intuitive understanding of a protocol,
the Spi Calculus specification is far more precise. Where the former leaves many subtler aspects of
the protocol to implication, the latter clearly specifies exactly how and when such aspects as nonce
instantiation and message component matching and verification, should be performed.
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2.2.6 Evaluation of Specification Languages
Table 1 summarises the specification languages discussed above, against the requirements we have
identified. By these criteria the Spi Calculus, SPL and CAPSL all appear to be suitable candidates.
We exclude CAPSL because it needs to be translated to CIL, which has the disadvantages discussed
previously. CPAL does not seem to have been used widely outside of the projects involving its
developers.
Our final choice, the Spi Calculus, was chosen over SPL, as its process have simpler, more explicit
and contained behaviour. Like SPL the Spi Calculus can be used to manually reason about a security
protocol, but it also has been used in conjunction with automatic model checkers [54]. Also, at the
time this work began, there were no code generation projects for Spi, while there was such a project
underway for SPL [42].
CAPSL/CIL CPAL Spi Calculus SPL Standard Notation
Usable Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Formal No/Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Suitable for Analysis No/Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Suitable for Code Generation No/Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Plain Text Specification Yes/Yes Yes Yes1 Yes1 Yes
Used in Multiple Projects Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Table 1: Existing security protocol languages against identified requirements.
2.3 High Integrity Code Generation
Code generation automates the process of translation from a (generally) higher level source language
to a (generally) lower level target language. A compiler is a specific instance of a code generator,
translating what is essentially a high level specification in a programming language such as C, to a
concrete implementation in executable machine code. In this work the type of code generation we
are interested in is the translation from fairly abstract high level specifications, to implementation
programs that can be compiled and executed.
Being an automated, mechanical process, code generation is more efficient, faster and less error
prone than manual implementation by human programmers. There is a caveat: an error in the code
generator will generate incorrect code more efficiently, faster and more regularly than those human
programmers. However, if a code generator is correct, or has properties that instill a high level of
confidence, that confidence can be carried over to all its output.
1With minor syntax modifications.
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In this section we summarise and discuss the requirements for “high integrity code generation”
identified by Whalen and Heimdahl in [64]. We then examine how adopting some of the aspects of
the approach of Hoare et al in developing verifiable compiling specification and prototype compiler
[10] meets some of these requirements.
2.3.1 Code Generation Requirements
Whalen and Heimdahl develop their requirements for code generation using a formal basis. In order
to reason about the properties of the generated code, it is necessary for the semantics of both the
source and target languages to be precisely (i.e. formally) defined. The translation process can then
be viewed as transformation function, much like the compiling relation between a source program
and its object code described by Hoare in [10]. Having this formal relation between the source
and target languages allows us to reason about them with the goal of showing that the generated
program in the target language is equivalent, or a refinements of, the specification in the source
language. This is the rationale behind the first and second of their requirements listed in [64, pages
2, 3 and 4]:
1. “The source and target languages must have formally well-defined syntax and semantics.”
2. “The translation between a specification expressed in a source language and a program ex-
pressed in a target language must be formal and proven to maintain the meaning of the
specification.”
3. “Rigorous arguments must be provided to validate the translator and/or the generated code.”
4. “The implementation of the translator must be rigorously tested and treated as high-assurance
software.”
5. “The generated code must be well structured, well documented, and easily traceable to the
original specification.”
Requirements 3 to 5 address the validation and correctness of the implementation of the translation
process. The third requirement continues the formal approach to code generation, while last two
are more practical requirements. These requirements are used later, both as a guide to developing
our code generation tool - Spi2Java, and as criteria to evaluate the tool against.
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2.3.2 Using Prolog to Implement Compilers
Hoare et al describe an approach to creating verifiable compilers in [10]. They develop a compiling
specification, defined in terms of logical rules, that describes how source language constructs are
translated into object code. Initially they define some axiomatic rules and develop a program
refinement calculus for working with those rules, that allows them to show that the execution of the
object code is equivalent or as good as the source program language segments that they are intended
to implement.
To prototype their verifiable compiler, Hoare et al use Prolog. Prolog’s declarative, rules based
nature allows the compiling specification, which as mentioned is defined in terms of logical rules, to
be very close to the implementation - the implementation is just a direct encoding of those rules in
Prolog.
Such an approach addresses the first three requirements of Whalen and Heimdahl - provided you
are confident in the Prolog implementation: formally defined source and target languages are used,
the translation - in this case defined by a compiling specification - is proven to preserve the source
language semantics and the translator or compiler is a direct implementation of the compiling spec-
ification which has been formally proven to be correct.
In a research project, meeting the fourth requirement may not be feasible, given the limited resources
available, compared to the resources actually required to thoroughly test any system. The final
requirement can be largely addressed by annotation of the generated code with comments indicating
the source language construct that each segment was translated from.
2.4 Discussion
In this background chapter we have looked at the security protocol development process and placed
the work described in this dissertation in the context of that process. We have introduced languages
for specifying security protocols, discussed how they can be used to analyse security protocols and
described how their formal nature is crucial for the correct implementation of security protocols.
Requirements for high integrity code generation were introduced. These requirements are employed
both as a guideline and as evaluation criteria for the code generation tool Spi2Java developed during
the course of this work and described in this dissertation. Finally the use of Prolog for implementing
compilers is briefly summarised, showing how Prolog language properties assist the implementation
code generation, or compiler, software.
Chapter 3
Formal Specification with Spi
Calculus
In this chapter we describe the Spi Calculus by first introducing process algebras in general and then
a specific process algebra called the pi-calculus. We then discuss how the Spi Calculus extends the
pi calculus and its suitability for specifying security protocols and verifying their properties. Finally
we introduce our modifications to the Spi Calculus to make it suitable for specifying input for an
automatic code generation tool.
3.1 Process Algebras
Process algebras are languages that have been developed to facilitate the formal description and
analysis of complex, communicating systems. As network security protocols are a special case of
communicating systems, popular process algebras such as CSP (Communicating Sequential Pro-
cesses) and the pi-calculus have been used to reason about their properties [40] [1], either proving
them correct or revealing flaws. A successful example of this application of process algebras, is
Lowe’s discovery of a flaw in the Needham-Schroeder public key authentication protocol [39]. The
flaw was revealed by specifying the protocol in CSP and checking the specification with the FDR
model checker, which produced a trace of an attack on the protocol [40].
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3.2 The pi-Calculus
The pi-calculus consists of terms, such as names, variables and pairs, and processes, such as sending
and receiving messages and parallel composition of processes. Each of the processes has a simple,
well defined behaviour. Despite its small size and relative simplicity, the pi-calculus is powerful in
its ability to describe concurrent systems.
We give a description of the syntax of the pi-calculus and the behaviour of its processes below for
convenience, summarising that in [1].
3.2.1 Grammar
To define the syntax an infinite set of names and an infinite set of variables over those names are
assumed.
Terms
Letting m, n, p and r range over names and x, y and z over variables, the syntax of terms of the
pi-calculus is defined by the grammar:
L, M, N ::=
n a name
(M, N) a pair
0 zero
suc(M) successor
x a variable
Processes
The process syntax is defined as follows:
P, Q, R ::=
M〈N〉.P
M(x).P
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P |Q
(νn)P
!P
[M isN ]P
0
let (x, y) = M inP
caseM of 0 : P suc(x) : Q
3.2.2 Informal Semantics
The behaviour of the pi-calculus process actions can be described in an intuitive and informal manner:
• m〈N〉.P will output N on channel m when an interaction with an input process occurs, and
then run P .
• m(x).P will input a term, say N , when an interaction occurs and then run P [N/x], i.e. all
occurrences of x substituted with N .
• P |Q is the parallel composition process and behaves as P and Q running in parallel.
• (νn)P creates a new, private name n and behaves like P . This process can be used to model
the generation of nonces.
• !P is replication, it behaves as an infinite number of processes P running in parallel.
• [M isN ]P behaves like P if the term M is the same as the term N or else it does nothing.
• 0 does nothing.
• let (x, y) = M inP allows M to be split. If M is a pair (N, L) then P [N/x][L/y] is run,
otherwise the process does nothing.
• caseM of 0 : P suc(x) : Q will run P if M is 0, Q[N/x] if M is suc(N) or do nothing.
• caseL of {x}N inP runs as P [M/x] if L is an encryption of M with N , otherwise it does
nothing.
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3.2.3 Example
To illustrate the use of the pi-calculus to specify a protocol, we give a trivial example: This (insecure)
protocol involves an initiator that sends a request message to elicit a response from a specific remote
principal, the responder. The initiator may then perform some kind of processing, not specified by
the protocol, on the response.
The initiator, A, sends a request message (message 1), containing a termM to the specified responder
B. M is a term suitable for uniquely identifying the current protocol run or session.
Upon receipt of the request, the responder replies with message 2, containing M concatenated
with its own response message N . The initiator receives this message and confirms that it is the
corresponding response from message 1, by checking that the first term of the response matches the
term M it sent in the request. If the terms match initiator is assured that the response corresponds
to the current request and not one from a previous run of the protocol that may have been delayed
on the communications channel. The initiator can then do whatever processing is required on N .
Informally the protocol might be specified in standard notation as:
1 A → B : M
2 B → A : M,N
This informal specification does not, however, explicitly indicate all the protocol requirements. The
requirement that the initiator check that the first term of the response message matchesM is implicit;
leaving the exact actions to be performed to interpretation by the protocol implementor. Through
oversight or inexperience, the programmer may misinterpret this specification, and introduce an
error into the protocol implementation code.
In contrast, the pi-calculus specification of the same protocol, allows the protocol specifier to make the
requirement explicit, albeit at the expense of a higher level of abstraction and ease of understanding.
To specify this protocol in pi-calculus, parameterised processes are defined for the initiator and
responder roles:
Initiator(CAB) = (νM)CAB〈M〉.
CAB(x).
let (y, N) = x in
[y isM ]F (N)
Responder(CAB , N)= CAB(M).
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CAB〈(M, N)〉.
nil
A further process, consisting of the parallel composition of the initiator and responder processes, is
defined to specify a run of the protocol:
Protocol = (νN)(νC)
(A(C) |B(C, M))
In pi-calculus specification, the initiator is provided with a channel, CAB , for communication with
the responder. The initiator generates a random value, M , and sends it on the channel. It waits
to receive a response message, x, which it attempts to split into a pair of terms, y and N . If the
split is successful, the initiator proceeds to match the first term, y, against the term M it originally
sent in the request message. Provided the match is successful, the initiator may assume that this is
the correct response message and perform whatever processing it needs to on N, by executing the
process F .
The responder process is simpler; it waits to receive a request message, and then sends a response
back containing the request paired with its own response term N .
3.2.4 Transition Semantics
The behaviour of the processes of the pi-calculus are formally defined by transition semantics in [51].
This formal definition provides the precise and unambiguous specification of behaviour required for
protocol analysis and implementation. Rather than give a complete definition of the semantics of
the pi-calculus processes, we shall introduce the more relevant definitions later in the thesis when we
develop a translation to executable code.
3.3 The Spi Calculus Extensions to pi
The Spi Calculus was developed by Abadi and Gordon in [1] by extending the pi-calculus to provide a
formal framework for reasoning about the properties of security protocols. Instead of using existing
pi-calculus constructs to model security functions, Spi add terms and process to the pi-calculus to
provide primitives for encryption, decryption and message digests.
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3.3.1 Grammar
In extending the pi-calculus, three new constructs representing the cryptographic primitives are
added: two terms for encryption and message digest creation and a process for decryption.
Terms
{M}N encryption
hash(M) message digest
The term {M}N is the cipher text obtained by encrypting a term M with the N .
The hash function hash(M), evaluates to the result of creating a message digest from a term M .
Processes
A single process
caseL of {x}N inP
is added for decryption. This process behaves as P provided the term L can be successfully decrypted
using the key term N . If it cannot the process halts.
3.3.2 Example
As an example of the use of Spi we specify a simple message exchange in the Spi Calculus:
A = CAB〈{IA}K〉.
B = CAB(xcipher).
xcipher case of {x}K in [x is IA]
F
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A and B are process definitions representing the initiator and responder respectively. CAB is a
public, insecure channel for communication between the two processes. IA is a value that uniquely
identifies the initiator and K is a key that is shared by the initiator and the responder.
A encrypts the identifier IA with the key K, and sends the result on the channel CAB when an
interaction occurs with another process.
B waits for an interaction on the channel CAB , and receives a message that is bound to variable
xcipher. B then attempts to decrypt xcipher with the key K. If the decryption is successful, the
resulting plain text is bound to variable x. If it is not the process becomes stuck. If x is equal to
the initiator’s identifier, IA, then the responder will perform some desired action specified by the
process definition F.
As well as allowing the behaviour of the protocol participants to be specified, the Spi Calculus allows
a run of the protocol to be defined by allowing A to B to be executed in parallel. An instance of
the protocol can thus be specified as:
I(M) = (νK)(A|B)
The key K is created by the restriction process, and is only in the scope of the processes A and
B. This accurately models the fact the K is a shared secret between the two protocol participants
whose behaviour is specified by A and B.
3.3.3 Spi Semantics
As Spi is an extension of pi, pi’s transition semantics are applicable. However, a further formal
definition of the Spi Calculus, using reaction relations, is given in [1]. This definition is also suitable
as a basis for reasoning about the properties of security protocols specified in the Spi Calculus as
demonstrated in [1]. Again, rather than give a complete definition of the semantics of the pi and
Spi processes, we shall introduce the relevant definitions later in this dissertation, when we develop
a mapping from Spi process actions to executable code.
3.4 Modification of Spi for Code Generation
To facilitate code generation, we define a variation of the standard Spi Calculus by making a few
modifications. In this section we describe the modifications and the rationale for them.
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3.4.1 Supporting an Executable Subset of Spi
A subset, albeit a comprehensive one, of the terms and processes defined by the original calculus
are supported. The reasons for not supporting some of the constructs are given below:
• Successor Function: This function may be required by some protocols, specifically those
that require the response to a challenge nonce to contain the value of the nonce incremented
by a specific value. Currently we have no need for it, but it would be a fairly simple addition.
• Integer Case Process: This process would be required to verify the response nonce in the
scenario described above.
• Summation: The summation process is non-deterministic. As it is not required for specifying
the Spi process for an individual protocol role, it can be conveniently left out.
• Replication: Replication, which is defined to behave as infinitely many copies of a process
running in parallel, is not supported for code generation as it is, by definition, unimplementable.
3.4.2 Spi Specification in Plain Text
Minor syntactic changes are defined to allow security protocols to be described in plain, ASCII
encoded, text files. These include using the ! and ? characters to indicate output and input
respectively - as in Occam [57], a programming language based on the CSP process algebra.
3.4.3 Support for Retrieving Public and Private Keys
We introduce the terms pub(x) and priv(x), which evaluate to the public and private keys of the
principal x respectively, following an element of the syntax used by SPL [15].
3.4.4 Tuples
We adopt the standard abbreviations in [1] for constructing tuples from pairs and splitting tuples.
(N1, ..., Ni−1, Ni) is written for (N1, (N2, ( ..., (Ni−1, Ni)))) and let (x1, ..., xi) = M inP is written
for let (x1, t1) = M in let (x2, t2) = t1 in ... let (xx−1, xi) inP .
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3.4.5 Timestamp Validation
A process that checks the validity of a timestamp is defined as: case x valid inP . This process
behaves as P , provided the timestamp, x, is valid, i.e. it has not expired.
3.4.6 Typed Variables
To facilitate the code generation, we have added type indicators to the syntax of all the binding
process actions, i.e. input, restriction, decryption or pair splitting. Instead of just declaring the
variable, x, a type declaration is appended to get x : Type. For instance, the restriction process
that creates a new nonce is (x : Nonce). The syntax we have chosen follows that for the applied Spi
Calculus described in [47].
Type declarations allow the code generator to specify the type of the corresponding variable in the
implementing language. The supported types are:
• Channel An atomic type representing a channel for communication between multiple princi-
pals.
• Encryption An atomic value type that is an encryption of a term, or cipher-text. Although
and Encryption is atomic it can be used, via the decryption process, to instantiate a term.
• Hash An atomic type representing a message digest.
• Identifier An atomic type for values that uniquely identify a principal.
• Key An atomic type for symmetric key values.
• Nonce An atomic type for nonce values.
• Pair A compound type for terms formed by pairing an atomic value, on the left, with a term
on the right. For example, (n,M) where n is an atomic value such as a nonce or key, and M
is an arbitrary term.
• Term A compound type for terms.
• UserData An atomic type for arbitrary user data that is not interpreted by the protocol itself.
• Timestamp An atomic type for timestamp values.
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3.4.7 The Modified Spi Grammar
With these modifications, our Spi Calculus variant for code generation is defined by the grammar
in figure 3
L, M, N ::=
n a name
(M, N) a pair
x a variable
{M}N encryption of M with N
hash(M) hash of M
pub(n) public key of n
priv(n) private key of n
P, Q ::=
c!〈N〉.P
c?(x : Type).P
(P |Q)
(n : Type)P
[M isN ]P
nil
let (x : Type, y : Type) = M inP
let (x1 : Type, ..., xi : Type) = M inP
caseL of {x : Type} inP
case T valid inP
Type ::=
Channel
Encryption
Hash
Identifier
Identifier
Key
Nonce
Pair
Term
UserData
T imestamp
Figure 3: The modified Spi Calculus grammar.
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3.5 Discussion
The Spi Calculus trades off some of the higher level abstraction and clarity of the standard notation,
for an explicit specification of the protocol logic, that define the logical steps required to achieve
the security goals of a protocol. However it still abstracts some low-level implementation details:
such as the format of messages and message components, the cryptographic algorithms used and
the communication mechanisms. As we shall discuss later, this level of abstraction allows the
implementation and verification of the protocol logic to be isolated from that of the cryptographic
algorithms and network communication.
By making some minor modifications to the Spi Calculus and its syntax, we have defined a variant
that is suitable for specifying input for a code generation tool, while retaining the Spi Calculus
semantics that make it suitable for analysing and verifying security protocols.
Chapter 4
Sn2Spi: Translating Informal to
Formal Specifications
This chapter covers the Sn2Spi translation tool that automates the translation of informal standard
notation specifications to formal Spi Calculus specifications. Essentially the standard notation is
defined as shorthand for a set of Spi processes, with each individual security protocol role specified
by a Spi process without parallel components.
We begin by defining a grammar for a strict version of the standard notation, making it suitable
for input into an automated software tool. We then define rules for translating specifications in this
notation to Spi Calculus processes. Finally we elaborate on the implementation of these rules by
describing the development of Sn2Spi.
Unlike the Spi2Java code generation tool (which forms the core of this work and is covered in chapter
6) a less rigorous approach was taken in developing Sn2Spi. Sn2Spi is not intended to meet the same
requirements for high integrity code generation that Spi2Java is evaluated against. However, it does
aim to automate the process of translating standard notation specifications to Spi Calculus processes.
This is beneficial, as most existing security protocols are only specified in some form of the standard
notation.
Once translated to Spi, the protocol specifications can be manually or automatically verified, to
ensure that they achieve the intended security goals.
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4.1 Standard Notation Syntax
Since many variations on the standard notation exist, we define an exact syntax for the notation in
figure 4.
Protocol ::= Roles Declarations ( Possession )* Messages
Roles ::= ( <ROLES> <ID> ( <COMMA> <ID> )* )
Possession ::= <POSSESSION> <ID> <COLON> <ID>
Declarations ::= ( ( <CHANNEL> | <IDENTIFIER> | <KEY> | <NONCE> |
<TIMESTAMP> | <USERDATA> ) <ID> ( <COMMA> <ID> )* )+
Messages ::= ( Message )*
Message ::= <ID> <ARROW> <ID> <COLON> Components
Components ::= ( Component ( <COMMA> Component )* )
Component ::= ( <ID> | CipherText | Hash )
Hash ::= <HASH> <LPAR> Components <RPAR>
CipherText ::= <LBRACE> Components <RBRACE> Key
Key ::= ( <ID> | <PUB> <LPAR> <ID> <RPAR> | <PRIV> <LPAR> <ID> <RPAR> )
Figure 4: The BNF grammar for the standard notation.
We extend the standard notation to allow information about the principals and their possessions to
be made explicit. A preamble, similar but simpler and less flexible than that used by CAPSL [21], is
defined. The preamble contains a list of participant roles defined by the protocol, type declarations
for the message components and a list of initial possessions for each of the roles.
1 A → B : {n, A}pub(B)
2 B → A : {n, m}pub(A)
3 A → B : {m}pub(B)
Figure 5: The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public Key Authentication protocol.
The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public Key Authentication protocol in figure 5, is specified in figure
6 using the defined syntax. This specification defines roles for an initiator, A, and a responder, B.
In this specification the initiating principal is A, the responder is B and pub(X) is a function that
returns X’s public key. Not shown in the example is the corresponding private key retrieval function,
priv(X), that returns X’s private key. An extra possession, cAB, is declared for each role, indicating
a communication channel shared by the Spi processes that specify the initiator and responder roles.
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Principals A, B
Channel cAB
Identifier A, B
Nonce m, n
Possession A:cAB
Possession A:A
Possession A:B
Possession B:cAB
Possession B:B
A -> B: {n, A}pub(B)
B -> A: {n, m, B}pub(A)
A -> B: {m}pub(B)
Figure 6: The NSL protocol specified for input into Sn2Spi
4.2 Translation Rules
4.2.1 Roles
For each of the principals A1, ..., An in the informal specification, corresponding Spi process defini-
tions, A1 = P1, ..., An = Pn , are created specifying the principals’ roles. The processes P1, ..., Pn
do not contain any parallel components.
4.2.2 Initial Possessions
A protocol may require that the principals fulfilling protocol roles have certain values in their pos-
session, such as shared keys and principal identifiers, prior to a protocol run commencing. These
are the initial possessions of the principal role. To specify this in Spi, a principal A’s process defi-
nition A = P , is parameterised by the initial possessions. Thus if a principal fulfilling the role A is
expected to have the possessions p1, ..., pn before commencing a run of the protocol, the parameter
list for A = P is updated to A(p1, ..., pn) = P .
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4.2.3 Protocol Messages
Each message A → B : m in an informal specification indicates principal A sending principal B a
message m. In Spi this corresponds to A’s process performing an output action that is intended to
interact with an input action performed by B’s process, on a dedicated channel for communication
between the two. Thus for each pair of communicating roles A and B, a Spi channel cAB is defined
and added to the parameter list of both A and B’s Spi process definitions.
The rules below describe how to develop the Spi process definitions A = P and B = Q for each
message in the informal specification. Initially P and Q are empty processes, but they are extended
as the rules are applied.
The Sending Principal Role
For each message A → B : m, the following actions are taken to develop the Spi process definition
for A’s role, A = P :
1. The parameter list of the process definition A = P is extended to incorporate the channel
cAB , provided it does not already contain this parameter.
2. If any of the components of m are nonces or timestamps and this is their first occurrence in the
informal specification, a Spi restriction action is appended to P to become P ′. For example,
if the first message in the informal specification is
A → B : {n, A}pub(B)
then this step transforms A = P to A = P (n).
3. Each component inm is paired with the component on the right to construct the corresponding
Spi termM . This follows the convention adopted in [1] where a tuple (N1, ..., Ni, Ni+1) is an
abbreviation for ((N1, ... , Ni), Ni+1) for i ≥ 2. An output action cAB ! < M > is appended
to P ′ to become P ′′. Continuing the example, we get Spi process definition
A(CAB) = (n)cAB ! < {n, A))}pub(B) > ...
for A’s role.
Once the rules have been applied, P is set to P ′′ and the process is repeated with the next message.
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The Receiving Principal Role
The rules to develop the Spi process for B’s role are more complex. This is due to actions that
B’s Spi process may need to perform to split the received message into its components, decrypt and
verify components. Pair splitting is necessary as the message m is received by B as a single Spi term,
say M , on the channel cAB . B’s Spi process then needs to recursively split M into its component
parts. Component verification is required when m contains components that are supposed to be
equal to values that B already has in its possession set or can calculate. Two specific examples
are nonce validation (where a nonce returned by A in response to a challenge nonce sent byB is
compared to the original challenge nonce) and timestamp validation (where a received timestamp is
checked to see if it has expired).
For each message A → B : m, the following actions are taken to develop the current Spi process
definition for B’s role, B = Q:
1. The parameter list of process definition B = Q is extended to incorporate the channel cAB ,
provided it does not already contain this parameter.
2. Again we follow an abbreviation in [1] that allows us to write let (x1, ..., xn) = M inP
instead of let (x1, t1) = M in let (x2, t2) in ... let(xn−1, xn) = tn−1 inP . Note that atomic
components include cipher texts, which can obviously be used to generate further Spi terms
via the Spi decryption action. Q becomes Q′ by having the necessary pair splitting actions
appended to it. For example, the message:
1)A → B : n, A, B
is translated to the Spi process for B’s role as follows:
B(CAB) = cAB?M.let (n, A, B) = M in ...
3. Where a message, or message component, is of the form {m}k in the informal specification,
the Spi process for the receiving principal has a decryption action caseM of {x}K in whereM
is the Spi term corresponding to {m}k and K is the Spi term corresponding to the key k. As
x may be a compound term itself, pair splitting actions may need to be append to the process
specification as described in step 2. Appending the required decryption actions change Q′ to
Q′′.
4. When response nonces, or other components that correspond to values B already possesses,
are in the received message m, they need to be compared against the corresponding value in
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B’s possession. To specify this, a match process for each such component of m is appended
to B’s Spi process definition taking Q′′ to Q′′′. The behaviour of the match is exactly that
required: if the components match, the process implementing the protocol can continue, if not
it halts.
5. Timestamp components can be validated by appending Spi timestamp validation actions to
the process taking Q′′′ to Q′′′′.
After the rules have been applied for the current message, Q is set to Q′′′′ and the process is repeated
for the next message.
4.3 Implementation of Translation Rules
The JavaCC compiler constructor, a tool combining some of the functionality of Lex and Yacc, was
used to implement the translation rules in the Sn2Spi tool. In combination with some lexing (token
parsing) rules, the grammar in figure 4 specifies parsing rules for JavaCC to use in creating Sn2Spi.
Along with the parsing rules we specified actions to generate the Spi processes for each message.
These actions follow the rules defined above by creating and populating nested objects that represent
Spi terms, processes and process definitions, during the parsing process. At the top level of these
objects are ones that represent the Spi processes for each of the protocol roles. Once constructed
they can be asked to return a string containing the Spi specification for role they represent. The
Java code that implements the translation rules is thus split between the JavaCC specification and
the Java classes for these objects. The JavaCC specification from which Sn2Spi was generated is
available at [5], along with the source for the supporting classes.
4.4 Example
The specification of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol in figure 6 is saved as an ASCII encoded
text file and input into Sn2Spi. The Sn2Spi generated output is listed in figure 7.
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A(A:Identifier, cAB:Channel, B:Identifier) =
(n:Nonce) (Msg 1)
cAB!<{n, A}pub(B)>.
cAB?(tmp3:Encryption). (Msg 2)
case tmp3 of {tmp0:Pair}priv(A) in
let (tmp1:Nonce, m:Nonce, tmp2:Identifier) = tmp0 in
[tmp1 is n]
[tmp2 is B]
cAB!<{m}pub(B)>. (Msg 3)
nil
B(cAB:Channel, B:Identifier) =
cAB?(tmp1:Encryption). (Msg 1)
case tmp1 of {tmp0:Pair}priv(B) in
let (n:Nonce, A:Identifier) = tmp0 in
(m:Nonce)
cAB!<{n, m, B}pub(A)>. (Msg 2)
cAB?(tmp3:Encryption). (Msg 3)
case tmp3 of {tmp2:Nonce}priv(B) in
[tmp2 is m]
nil
Figure 7: Spi specification of the NSL protocol generated by Sn2Spi.
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4.5 Discussion
Sn2Spi automates the process of translating informal specifications to formal ones. By translating
an existing standard notation protocol specification into a formal Spi Calculus specification, the
design and specification phase of the security protocol development process (described in figure 1)
is by-passed and the formal Spi Calculus specification can be subjected to the protocol analysis
phase: manual inspection and development of proofs and/or automatic verification using a model
checker such as MMC [54]. This process ensures that the Spi Calculus translation of the protocol
correctly describes the intended behaviour of the standard notation specification. The Spi Calculus
translation is suitable for use by the Spi2Java code generator without any modification, allowing the
implementation phase of the security protocol development to be automatically completed.
Sn2Spi is a useful aid in translating existing, informal protocol specifications to formal Spi Calculus
specifications. It is not intended to encourage the development of new security protocols by using
the standard notation to define an informal specification, and then converting that to Spi for analysis
and implementation. Rather, the security protocol engineer should specify security protocols in a
more formal manner, making the intended behaviour and security properties of the protocol clear,
precise and unambiguous.
Chapter 5
Security Protocol Primitives API
The Security Protocol Primitives (SPP) API provides access to the primitive cryptographic and
network communication functions required to implement a network security protocol. The API uses
a provider model, similar to that employed by Sun’s Java Cryptography Architecture [60], to expose
this functionality to the user in a manner independent of the underlying implementation.
In this chapter we discuss our rationale for, and approach to, developing this API; we outline the
functionality required of the API by the user; describe the design of the API, both in terms of the
classes and methods exposed to the user, and those defined for compliant provider implementations;
we describe some provider implementations we have developed and their use; justify the abstraction
of cryptographic operations and discuss the benefits of the API to this work.
5.1 Approach
A security protocol implementation can be split into two discrete parts. The first part is the
security protocol logic that determines when and what actions - such as decryption, comparison
and instantiation of message components - to perform. The second part is the code that implements
these actions - it determines how these actions are performed.
SPP defines a set of APIs that are exposed to the user. In this case the user is the code that imple-
ments the security protocol logic - and shall be referred to as such throughout the rest of this chapter.
SPP also defines an interface for providers, allowing third parties to provide an implementation that
conforms to this interface. The provider is free to use whatever asymmetric, symmetric and hashing
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algorithms they choose, combined with their preferred mode of network communication.
An implementation of a security protocol that uses SPP for cryptographic and network communi-
cation functions, can change between different provider implementations without modifying its own
code that implements the security protocol logic.
`
SPP API
JCE GSS API
Security Protocol Logic Implementation
Crypographic
Calls
Data Marshalling
Calls
Network
Calls
SPP Provider
Figure 8: The SPP API.
Providers may implement message components, such as principal identifiers, to conform to those
defined by existing standards and infrastructures e.g. X.509, Microsoft Active Directory services or
Internet Protocol addresses.
A provider may develop an implementation using elliptic curve asymmetric encryption, AES sym-
metric encryption and SHA message digests. For example: the provider may require 128 bits of
random data for nonce message components; component data may be marshalled for transmission
over networks by converting it to an XML document formatted according to a predefined Document
Type Definition (DTD) or schema; the resulting message could then be sent to remote principals
using SOAP over HTTP.
Another provider may prefer a more traditional approach: implementing RSA encryption, 3DES
symmetric encryption and MD5 message digests; pseudo randomly generated 32 bit integers may be
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deemed sufficient for nonce components; other data may be marshalled to a compact binary format,
and written and read directly to and from a stream sockets interface to TCP/IP.
5.2 SPP User Functionality
This section serves as a high level functional specification by describing the cryptographic and
network functions exposed to the SPP user.
5.2.1 Message Component Types
Network security protocols exchange messages consisting of one or more components. SPP defines
abstraction for well defined components that can be operated on by SPP functions and for general
user data:
• Encrypted Component : A message component containing encrypted data.
• Message Digest : A component containing a message digest or hash.
• Nonce: A data component generated in an unguessable or (pseudo) random way.
• Principal Identifier : A component that uniquely identifies a principal.
• Public Key : The public component of a public private key pair.
• Symmetric Key : A symmetric key component.
• Timestamp: A timestamp.
• User Data: A message component containing arbitrary user data.
A Private Key interface also exists, but is not exposed as a message component, preventing trans-
mission over a network as part of a protocol message. Private keys generally require a higher level
of security than symmetric keys - which often play the role of session keys. Revealing a private key
can have severe consequences, and hence they are rarely transmitted over a network.
5.2.2 Cryptographic Functions
The SPP supports the following cryptographic operations:
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• Symmetric encryption and decryption.
• Asymmetric encryption and decryption using public and private key pairs.
• Generating message digests components.
• Generating nonce message components.
• Generating and validating timestamp message components.
• Retrieving principals’ public and private keys in the possession of the local principal.
5.2.3 Message Component Functions
The user, i.e. the code that implements the security protocol logic, dictates which message compo-
nents to generate or verify and when. In the case of a nonce challenge, the user determines when a
new nonce is generated and incorporated into a message to be sent to a remote principal. At a later
stage the remote principal may return a copy of this nonce. The user will determine which is the
original nonce it should be compared to, and what to do if the two aren’t equal. How the nonces
are compared and packed into messages is of no concern to the user, other than trusting that the
operations are performed correctly, and are handled by SPP.
Some of the message component operations are:
• Compare two message components for equality.
• Pack (serialise) message components so that they can be sent as binary data.
• Unpack (deserialise) message components from a received binary data.
5.2.4 Network Communication Functions
The network communication functionality is summarised as follows:
• Channels abstract network protocol specific details by exposing an endpoint for communication
with a remote principal.
• Arbitrary message data can be sent on a channel.
• Channels guarantee that messages are delivered in their entirety and in order.
• Functions for packing and unpacking of message components from data sent and received over
channels.
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5.3 SPP Design
5.3.1 Architecture
The design of the SPP API aims to provide high level, simple access to cryptographic functions
by hiding implementation specifics from the user. To achieve this, established design patterns
are used to decouple the implementation of cryptographic algorithms from the exposed user APIs.
The implementation can be written by any provider as long as it conforms to the defined SPP
provider interface. Multiple providers can be used, though obviously not concurrently, and the
desired provider can be selected at runtime.
Network functions are abstracted. The SPP user only needs to deal with the channel interface to
communicate with a remote principal. The provider is responsible for linking principal identifiers to
real network addresses, such as IP hostnames or directory entries, and establishing connections to
remote principals. Likewise, the provider must deliver user message data in its entirety, regardless
of the underlying implementation of the channel abstraction; e.g. if the provider uses a datagram
protocol, it must ensure that the user does not need to do any work to order the data and verify
that it is complete when reading it from a channel.
The format of messages and message components - such as principal identifiers, nonces and times-
tamps - is determined by the provider. These specifics are hidden from the user; they will call SPP
defined user functions (implemented by the provider) to operate on message components.
Principal identifiers, shared symmetric keys, and public and private keys in the possession of the
local principal may be stored in a provider specific format on file, or retrieved by some end user
interface such as a console.
Design patterns are solutions to commonly occurring problems and provide common terms of ref-
erence for developers. Figure 9 shows the bridge pattern that is used to separate the abstract
interfaces for the message components and cryptographic and network operations, from the concrete
SPP provider implementation. The factory method and builder patterns are used to allow SPP user
code, to access the SPP provider implementation to instantiate, encrypt, decrypt, hash and validate
message components. The factory pattern also allows a security protocol implementation to choose
an SPP provider at runtime.
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5.3.2 SPP Client API
The client part of the SPP API defines the public interfaces that clients, such as Spi2Java generated
security protocol implementations, can use to access network and cryptographic functionality. The
client interface is separated into two main areas: abstract classes and interfaces that represent
message components and channels for communication, and functions that perform cryptographic
operations, construct messages and return objects that conform to the specified interfaces or extend
the abstract classes.
The message component interfaces are declared in the sprite.spp.term.* package. They extend the
Term base interface. Figure 9 shows how the Name interface inherits from and specialises this inter-
face. The name interface is then extended Nonce, Identifier and other name message components.
Compound message components such as Encryption and Hash also extend Term.
The sprite.spp.Factory interfaces provides access to instantiating these message components as well
the implementations of the sprite.spp.crypto.Crypto and sprite.spp.net.Channel classes that expose
methods for cryptographic operations and provide endpoints for communication, respectively.
5.3.3 SPP Provider Interface
The provider part of the SPP is also twofold: there are the client interfaces and abstract classes
that provider class implementations must conform to, but there are also factory interfaces that
must be implemented by a provider. These factory interfaces allow the internals of the SPP API to
instantiate provider implementations of interfaces and pass them to the requesting client.
5.4 Abstracting Cryptographic Implementation Details
The scope of this work has been limited by not addressing the issue of the correctness of the
cryptographic implementation. By de-coupling it from the other code that implements the security
protocol, it can be addressed independently, as discussed in Section 9.2 on future work.
5.5 Implemented Providers
Our current SPP Providers all use the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.22 for Java 1.4. Any
other JCE compliant provider can be substituted with a one line code change.
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5.5.1 Standard Provider
The Standard Provider is a practical implementation for real world use. It the client code to
communicate with remote principals over TCP/IP networks, such as the internet. It employs AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) for symmetric cryptography, RSA for asymmetric cryptography
and SHA for generating message digests.
Message components can be packed (serialised) to a data field suitable for transport over a network.
The data field for some message components may start with a length indicator, indicating the length
of the field excluding the length indicator. The length indicator is a two byte unsigned integer,
encoded in big endian (network) order. When such a length indicator is used, the maximum length
of the field, without the indicator, is 65535 bytes.
• Encrypted Component: A length indicator followed by the encrypted data. The data may
be encrypted by using either the AES symmetric encryption algorithm using a 128 bit key in
CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode with PKCS5 padding, or RSA public or private encryption
using the standard ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode.
• Message Digest: A 20 byte field containing a SHA message digest.
• Nonce: A 16 byte field containing pseudo randomly generated data. The TCP Provider uses the
java.security.SecureRandom API. JCE Providers which implement this interface must conform to
the randomness tests specified in FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Mod-
ules, section 4.9.1 [28] and RFC 1750: Randomness Recommendations for Security [17] [59].
• Principal Identifier: A 16 byte field containing a string of 16 ASCII encoded characters that
uniquely identifies a principal.
• Public Key: A length indicator followed by an ASN.1 encoding of an RSA public key according
to the X.509 standard.
• Symmetric Key: 16 bytes containing the raw data of a 128 bit AES key.
• Timestamp: An 8 byte signed long integer. The timestamp reflects the number of milliseconds
elapsed between the current time and midnight on the 1st January 1970; this is as returned
by a call to the Java long java.lang.System.currentTimeMillis() API.
• User Data: A length indicator followed by up to 65535 bytes of data in user specified format.
The Standard Provider ensures the delivery of messages in their entirety by prefixing them with a
length, as described above. On the receiver’s side, the provider automatically reads two bytes from
its TCP/IP endpoint and determines the expected length of the entire message.
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5.5.2 Typed Component Provider
The Typed Component SPP Provider extends the Standard Provider by using a tagging scheme, as
proposed in [30]. In this implementation, a single byte is prepended to each message component. The
byte contains a value that indicates the type of component. Should the type indicator of a received
message component not match the expected type of the component, the provider implementation
throws an exception, causing the execution of the protocol implementation to halt.
This prevents an attacker from successfully perpetrating a type flaw attack, by attempting fool a
principal into interpreting a message component of one type, as one of another type. Heather et al
show in [30] that a tagging scheme, such as the one implemented by this provider, is sufficient to
prevent type flaw exploitations.
5.5.3 Simulation Provider
We have implemented an SPP provider for running simulation components. The details of this
provider are discussed in chapter 7. The purpose of the Simulation SPP Provider is to provide an
environment in which a protocol run, possibly including attempted attacker roles, can be executed
and controlled by the user.
5.6 Discussion
By decoupling the security protocol logic implementation from the cryptographic and communication
implementation, the SPP API allows the issue of the correctness of these two components to be
addressed separately.
As SPP provides a comprehensive set of cryptographic and communications functionality, it can also
be used by security protocol implementations that are manually coded or generated by tools other
than Spi2Java.
Chapter 6
Spi2Java: Code Generation from
Specifications
In this chapter we cover the design and implementation of the Spi2Java code generator. We give
an overview of Spi2Java and how the code it generates works, discuss our choice of source language
(Spi Calculus) and target language (Java). We also describe our approach to, and development of, a
mapping from Spi Calculus constructs to Java code. The implementation of the mapping in Prolog
is covered. Finally we evaluate Spi2Java against the criteria for high integrity code generation.
6.1 Overview
Spi2Java is a code generator that takes a network security protocol specified in the Spi Calculus as
input, and generates Java code implementing the protocol as output. It is essentially a Spi Calculus
to Java compiler.
Spi2Java generates code by applying a specified mapping from Spi language constructs to Java
code segments. It is implemented in Prolog, so that its compiling specification is very close to the
implementation.
The generated Java code defines a class that extends the predefined sprite.spi.Process class. The
generated class accesses cryptographic and network communications functionality via calls to the
SPP API, either directly or indirectly via methods inherited from its parent class. The SPP API
abstracts implementation specifics from the generated code. It allows different pluggable providers,
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that implement their own choice of network communications protocols and cryptographic algorithms,
to be used without requiring changes to the generated code.
This architecture is outlined in figure 10: Generated Class represents the generated code that makes
function calls to the SPP API, either directly or through its parent Process Class. The SPP API then
routes these calls to the currently installed provider, that may use libraries such as the Java Cryptog-
raphy Extensions (JCE ) or General Security Services API (GSS API ) to implement cryptographic
services.
Figure 10: Generated class code relies on the Process class, the SPP API and SPP provider imple-
mentations.
6.2 Source and Target Languages
6.2.1 Source Language: Spi Calculus
The Spi Calculus, with the modifications we have defined, is the input language. Its properties, which
make it a suitable formalism for security protocol specification and analysis, and its suitability for
input to a code generation tool, are covered in detail in chapter 3.
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6.2.2 Target Language: Java
Core Language Properties
The Java language, in combination with the Java Virtual Machine, has many properties that make
programming in Java less error prone than some traditional languages. Although it has large well
defined set of APIs associated with it, the actual Java language itself is very small and relatively
simple.
Java has memory management in the form of garbage collection, freeing the programmer from having
to explicitly free memory allocated on the heap. This prevents memory leaks in most, though not
all, situations.
Bounds checking on array access avoids the possibility of a Java program accessing memory that
is not in its address space or that does not belong to the array being traversed. Bounds checking
negates the whole class of buffer overflow attacks that have plagued many network applications.
Java is a strongly typed language. Research has shown that Java’s type safety holds: an object
cannot be cast to type, or an expression cannot be evaluated to a type class to which it does not
belong or does not inherit from without an exception being raised by the system [62, 25]. Static type
checking detects many errors at compile time that would otherwise only be encountered at runtime.
Java APIs for Networking and Security
Java’s large set of well defined APIs includes libraries for network communication and cryptography.
The networking API exposes consistent and easy way to use TCP/IP and UDP/IP communication on
all the supported platforms. Similarly, the Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) API allows multiple
provider implementations to be used. This model is particularly beneficial as if the cryptographic
provider used by a security application is found to be flawed, it can be swapped with a (hopefully
correct) provider from another vendor without changing application code.
Portability and Platform Independence
The Java language is portable across a variety of hardware architectures and operating systems. Its
associated APIs are largely platform independent, though behaviour of some of its interfaces may
vary slightly.
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Formal Semantics
The Java language is officially defined by the Java Language Specification. Although this does
not include a formal definition of the semantics of the language, a number of research publications
have defined a formal model of the language, or at least for significant subsets thereof. The formal
approaches to specifying Java have included behavioural definitions using Gurevich’s Abstract State
Machines [8], process algebras such as pi-calculus [35] and CSP [46] and a Hoare type calculus [62].
Widely Used
The Java language is widely used with implementations from a number of commercial and open
source vendors. It has also been used as the target language for many code generation projects -
including other tools that have been used to generate security protocol implementations [50, 23, 18].
6.3 Code Generation
6.3.1 Approach
Some approaches to implementing process algebras in Java [14, 38, 42] have encapsulated language
constructs in individual classes. They provide the high level of abstraction necessary for implement-
ing concurrent systems in general, where parallel communicating processes may be operating locally
or on different machines, and synchronising and communicating over a network or a built in lan-
guage feature (e.g. Java’s synchronisation). As the Spi Calculus is used to specify network security
protocols, the process behaviour is more restricted, allowing a simpler approach to implementation.
In our approach each Spi processes that specifies a role in a security protocol, is implemented as an
instance method on a Java class. These methods are publicly exposed, providing other Java software
applications access to an implementation of the security protocol. Spi variables are mapped directly
to Java variables that can be assigned that value of Java expressions that correspond to closed Spi
terms. Spi names - such as channels, nonces and keys - are implemented as classes from the SPP
API, discussed previously. For example, a Spi Calculus nonce variable, x : Nonce, is implemented
in Java by the declaration sprite.spp.term.Nonce x.
Spi processes that specify individual security protocol roles do not contain parallel components.
However, in to order specify a run of a protocol, a process containing parallel components - which will
be the Spi processes that specify the individual protocol roles - are required. We have implemented
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parallelism in two ways: explicitly and implicitly. The explicit implementation spawns new threads
to execute the Java code that implements each of the parallel components of a Spi process. This
allows code to be generated that defines the entire system of a protocol - its participant roles and
attacks - making a simulated run of the system possible in a single process space.
The implicit “implementation” relies on the fact that in practice, the participant role implementa-
tions will be run in separate process spaces on separate machines, and as such do not require any
extra Java code to be emitted.
6.3.2 Generated Code Structure
Spi2Java implements a security protocol by generating a class, named after the protocol, with the
Spi processes that specify each protocol role implemented as an instance method on this class.
The generated class extends the sprite.spi.Process class that contains a set of protected instance of
cryptographic and network functionality. These methods, listed in figure 11, are short and simple
and serve to make the Spi2Java generated code cleaner and easier to read. None of these methods
contain try-catch-finally blocks, ensuring that any exception thrown by the SPP API propagate up
to their caller.
protected final InputStream decrypt(Encryption encryption, Key k) Decryption.
protected final Nonce newNonce() Instantiate a new nonce.
protected final Timestamp newTimestamp() Instantiate a timestamp.
protected final InputStream recv(Channel c) Receive a message.
protected final void send(Channel c, Term m) Send a message.
protected final boolean valid(Timestamp t) Validate a timestamp.
protected final Encryption encrypt(Term term, Key k) Encryption.
protected final Term hash(Term m) Generate a message digest..
protected final Term pair(Term m, Term n) Construct a pair.
protected final Key priv(Identifier i) Return private key.
protected final Key pub(Identifier i) Return public key.
protected final TermFactory getTermFactory() Return the provider’s factory class.
protected final Trace newTrace(String name) Instantiate a trace object.
Figure 11: The instance method exposed by the Process base class.
An example generated class for a protocol P, with initiator and responder roles defined by the
Spi processes Init(x1 : Type1, x2 : Type2, x3 : Type3, ...) and Resp(x1 : Type1, x2 : Type2, x3 :
Type3, ...) respectively, is listed in figure 12.
As each Spi process definition is emitted as an instance method on the generated class, the protocol
roles are all accessible from a single class. Invocations of these methods are stateless, and hence
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package protocol;
import java.io.*;
import sprite.spi.*;
import sprite.spp.*;
import sprite.spp.net.*;
import sprite.spp.term.*;
public class P extends sprite.spi.Process
{
public P(Provider provider)
{
super(provider);
}
public void Init(Type1 x1, Type2 x2, Type3 x3, ...)
{
// Code implementing Init...
}
public void Resp(Type1 x1, Type2 x2, Type3 x3, ...)
{
// Code implementing Resp...
}
}
Figure 12: Example generated class for protocol P with initiator and responder roles.
thread safe, allowing a single class instance to be shared by all threads executing protocol roles, in
the case of a simulated protocol run in a single process space.
6.4 Mapping Spi to Java
6.4.1 Approach to Program Refinement
For Spi2Java, generating code to implement a security protocol, is essentially compiling a Spi Cal-
culus process to Java code. In this section we develop a mapping from Spi Calculus process actions
to Java code segments. Ideally we would like to formally prove that semantics of the Spi Calculus
process actions is preserved in each Java code segment that they are mapped to.
The approach to this is generally to map the specification (Spi process action) data to the implemen-
tation (Java code segment) data by means of a data mapping function. It must then be shown that
the implementation code leaves the implementation data in a state consistent with the corresponding
specification data as defined by the semantics of the specification process action. This involves using
the semantics of the specification to define pre and post-conditions on the implementation data. The
post-condition must hold after the execution of the implementation, provided the pre-condition held
60 CHAPTER 6. SPI2JAVA: CODE GENERATION FROM SPECIFICATIONS
before.
In developing the mapping definition from Spi to Java, we have not provided rigorous formal proofs
that Java code preserves the semantics of Spi. We have, however, made informal arguments where
feasible, using both transition semantics for Spi and Borger et al’s Abstract State Machine (ASM)
semantics for Java [8], that each Java code segment preserves the semantics of its corresponding Spi
process action.
We use the transition semantics for Spi to define pre and post-conditions on Spi data for some of
the Spi process actions. These conditions are then applied to the corresponding Java data variables
- which are determined by a trivial data mapping described below. We then show that, according to
the ASM semantics for the Java statements that implement the process actions, the post-condition
will hold after the Java code is executed.
6.4.2 Data Mapping Function
As in [10], we view compilation as a relation between the source program and the implementing
code. In this case the source program is the Spi process s and the implementing code is the Java
code j. A symbol table is required to map the elements of the data space operated on by s to those
operated on by j.
We define the symbol table by the injective function f that maps elements of the Spi data space to
those of the Java data space, and its inverse f−1 which does the reverse. For example, if xSpi, ySpi
and zSpi are Spi terms that correspond to the Java expressions xJava, yJava and zJava respectively,
we define f as:
f(xSpi) = xJava
f(ySpi) = yJava
f(zSpi) = zJava
and its inverse f−1 as:
f−1(xJava) = xSpi
f−1(yJava) = ySpi
f−1(zJava) = zSpi
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For convenience, we shall often denote f(x) in the Java code listings that follow, by just referring to
it as x using the font used for all Java code listings.
6.4.3 Type Mapping
Likewise we define a mapping from Spi types to Java types in table 2. The Java types have the same
names as the Spi type bar being pre-fixed by a packaged name.
Spi Calculus Type Java Type
Channel sprite.spp.net.Channel
Encryption sprite.spp.term.Encryption
Hash sprite.spp.term.Hash
Identifer sprite.spp.term.Identifier
Key sprite.spp.term.Key
Nonce sprite.spp.term.Nonce
Pair sprite.spp.term.Pair
Timestamp sprite.spp.term.Timestamp
UserData sprite.spp.term.UserData
Table 2: The instance method exposed by the Process base class.
Again, for convenience, we shall use Spi and Java types interchangeably, using the different fonts for
Spi and Java listing to indicate context.
6.4.4 Mapping Definitions
In this section we develop a mapping for each Spi Calculus process action to a Java code segment
or code template. The code templates are parameterised by
• Java variables that correspond to Spi variables affected by the Spi process action,
• Java types that correspond to Spi types and
• Java expressions that correspond Spi terms.
The implementation of the mapping, is responsible for setting the parameters to instantiate the
templated code.
We define code templates for the following Spi process actions:
• Restriction (nonce and timestamp generation) - (n)P
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• The nil process - nil
• Input - c?(M).P
• Output - c? < M > .P
• Pair/tuple splitting - let (x1, ..., xi) = M inP
• Decryption - caseM of {x} inP
• Timestamp validation - case x valid inP
To develop the Java implementations for these actions, we first define the Java implementations for
two basic Spi Calculus behaviours: the behaviour of a process that is stuck and a variable binding or
substitution. After defining implementations for these behaviours we move on to the process actions
above.
Stuck Process Behaviour
A number of Spi processes are defined to terminate under certain circumstances. They differ from the
nil process, which also terminates, in that they indicate the process has not terminated successfully.
When such circumstances arise, the defined process behaviour is to do nothing, i.e. become stuck.
In the context of a Spi process that specifies a security protocol, becoming stuck is generally an
indication that something has gone wrong with the run of the protocol. For example: the match
process [MisN ]P only behaves as P if M matches N , otherwise it is stuck. This may be because
the value of a received message component was not equal to the expected value, possibly indicating
an attempted attack on the protocol.
In our mapping, the behaviour of a stuck process is implemented by throwing an exception. Given
that Spi2Java only emits try-catch-finally statements when it instantiates a new thread to implement
a parallel component, exceptions thrown in a method the implements a Spi process that specifies a
protocol role will bubble up to the caller of that method. This results in some desired properties:
1. No further statements, or method calls, in the current method are executed. Thus execution
of the protocol role implementation terminates.
2. Control is passed to the calling method.
3. Information about the cause of the termination can be passed to the caller for logging.
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Certain conditions that can cause a process implementation to become stuck - for instance, pair split-
ting where the underlying raw data has become corrupt - can only be detected by the SPP Provider
code. This code it is allowed to throw an exception, which - because there are no try-catch-finally
statements generated method that calls it - has the same effect as generated method throwing an
exception: That is, it causes the process implementation to terminate.
This implementation behaviour is refinement of the Spi specification behaviour: it can - potentially
- halt more often, but always halts under the same circumstances as the Spi specification
Variable Binding or Substitution
In the Spi Calculus, an action α, preceding a process P , may contain a binding occurrence of a
variable, or perhaps multiple variables - as in the case of the pair splitting action. The syntax of
such an action introduces a new variable that references a location containing a value in P . The
variables act as a place holders and are essentially substituted with a value as a result of the execution
of the action, causing all occurrences of the variables in the process to reference that value.
Formally the behaviour of binding actions can be generalised by the transition semantics:
−
αP
α−→ P [ ~N/~x] ~x ∈ bn(α)
This is read as meaning that the process αP can progress to behave as process P , with all free
occurrences of the variables in ~x substituted with their corresponding values in ~N , after the action
α has occurred. The input process c?(x).P is an example of this: the input action reads the term
N from channel c then the process can proceed as P with all free occurrences of x replaced with N ,
i.e. as P [N/x].
Given the pre-condition that f(x) is unassigned, i.e. x is null, the Java implementation of P [N/x]
must satisfy the post-condition f(x) = f(N), i.e. the Java variable x must be assigned the result
of evaluating the Java expression N, or the execution of the process must terminate.
The intuitive way to implement the substitution P [N/x] in Java is by assignment. The ASM
definition for Java assignment, from [8], is:
if (task is var = exp) then
loc(var) := val(exp)
val(task) := val(exp)
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proceed
The dynamic function loc maps local variables to values while var maps an expression to a value. We
derive the Java code template to implement the substitution P [N/x] by replacing var with the Java
variable x, which corresponds to the Spi variable x, i.e. it is f(x), and exp with the Java expression
N which corresponds to the Spi term N , i.e. it is f(N). According the definition the assignment task
updates loc at x to the value of val at N, i.e. loc(x) := val(N), which is exactly the post-condition. If
an exception is thrown during the evaluation of N, we get the stuck process behaviour defined above,
which terminates the process as desired.
Thus we define P [N/x] to map to the Java code template in figure 13. The code template is
parameterised by the type declaration Type, the variable name x, and the expression N. Spi type of x.
final Type x = N;
if (x == null) throw new AssignmentException();
// Code implementing P...
Figure 13: Implementation of substitution or variable binding.
Accurately implementing Spi substitution requires that the Java code template ensures x cannot be
re-assigned by the Java code that implements P . Java’s final variable declaration modifier is used
(see line 1 of the code template) to ensure that the variable can only be assigned to once, as defined
by the JLS [34]. Because most formal definitions of Java semantics describe its dynamic behaviour,
they don’t cover final variable declaration and assignment. We have to rely on the JLS’s informal
description that states that a final variable may only be assigned to once [34]. Violations of this
constraint are intended to be caught by the compiler and hence are a static concern.
The evaluation of the Java expression N, will generally involve a call to an SPP provider function.
Because provider code is relied on there is no guarantee N will not evaluate to null, instead of a valid
Type instance. To mitigate this risk we add an assertion (line 2 of the code template) that will ensure
x is a assigned a non-null value or else throw an exception.
Throwing an exception in such circumstances ensures the code is fail fast : the code fails immediately
and non-deterministic behaviour is not introduced by a NullPointerException possibly being thrown
at an unknown later point in the code, when x is accessed. As no subsequent method statements are
executed, the Spi semantics are preserved: the code that implements P is not executed and again,
the behaviour of the stuck process is implemented.
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In the cases where an exception is thrown, either by the SPP provider or because N evaluated to
null, the implementation of the Spi process αP will not progress to become P [N/x], instead it will
halt. Thus the process implemented by the code template is actually P [N/x]+nil, it behaves either
as P [N/x] or the nil process. Fortunately the process P + nil is a refinement or simulation of the
process P , as shown in [51] and by the fact that P + nil must terminate as frequently or more than
P .
Nil
The nil process action can be explicitly written as the final action of a Spi Calculus process, indicating
that it has successfully finished. It can also be omitted, in which case it is implied. Its behaviour is
to do nothing. The Java code that implements a Spi process definition is emitted by Spi2Java in a
single instance method that has a void return type. Thus the behaviour of the nil process is exactly
implemented by the return statement at the end of the method, which like nil can be explicitly listed
at the end of the method, or omitted but still implicit.
Process Definition
The transition semantics for a pi-calculus process definition, A(~y) = P , are given in [51]:
P [~y/~x] α−→ P ′
A(~y) α−→ P ′ A(~x) = P
This says that provided P [~y/~x], i.e. P with the elements of ~y substituted for the corresponding
elements of ~x, can progress to P ′, then A(~y) can to - with the obvious side condition that A(~x) = P .
As we intend to implement Spi Calculus process definitions with instance method calls, we cannot
use the Java assignment implementation for substitution defined previously. Instead, the method
call implements the substitution in much the same way. We thus implement Spi process definition
of the form A(x1 : Type1, x2 : Type2, x3 : Type3...) = P with the code template in figure 14. The
Java instance method parameters and their types, are exactly the Java variables that correspond to
the Spi variables that are A’s parameters, hence the code template is parameterised by the types
Type1, ..., TypeN and variable names x1, ..., xN.
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public void A(Type1 x1, ..., TypeN xN)
{
// Code implementing P...
}
Figure 14: Implementation of process definition A(x1 : Type1, x2 : Type2, x3 : Type3, ...) = P .
Input
The following transition rule defines the behaviour of the Spi input action:
−
x?(y).P
x?(M)−→ P [M/y]
M /∈ fn((y)P )
Intuitively this means that the Java code template that implements the input action x?(y), should
block until it reads some data that corresponds to the Spi term M from a network communication
endpoint that corresponds to the Spi channel x. This data should then be assigned to the Java
variable that corresponds to y.
To implement the input action we employ our generalised definition for implementing substitution.
The only specialisation required is to substitute the Java expression N from the implementation defini-
tion, with a method call that will return data corresponding toM , read from the communication end-
point corresponding to channel c. An instance method InputStream recv(x) on the sprite.spi.Process
class handles calling the underlying provider implementation and returning the data corresponding
to M in an java.io.InputStream instance. The resulting code template is shown in figure 15 and is
parameterised by the variable name y and the Channel variable x.
final InputSream y = recv(x);
if (y == null) throw new AssignmentException();
Figure 15: Implementation of the input process x?(y).P .
As we don’t have control of the provider code that is called by recv(x), we assume that it returns
the data or throws and exception if it encounters an error.
The pre and post-condition are as for the substitution code template: that is, y is null, and y equals
the value returned by the evaluation of recv(x) or the process must terminate. As the same semantic
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definition is used as for substitution, we are assured that the post-condition holds.
Restriction
The pi-calculus defines restriction, (y)P, to have the following transition semantics:
P
α−→ P ′
(y)P α−→ (y)P ′ y /∈ n(α)
meaning that if the process P can evolve into the process P’ after the execution of some action α,
then the process P preceded by the restriction (y) can progress to P’ given that y is not a name in
α.
Again we specialise the defined implementation for substitution; this time replacing the Java ex-
pression N with a call to Nonce Process.newNonce() to get the code template in figure 16 which is
parameterised by the variable name y.
final Nonce y = newNonce();
// Code implementing P...
Figure 16: Implementation of the restriction or nonce generation process (y)P .
The Nonce newNonce() instance method handles the call to the provider code and returns a Nonce
instance that encapsulates (pseudo) randomly generated data that is suitable for use as a nonce.
The implementation of the Nonce newNonce() method is simply:
protected final Nonce newNonce()
{
return getTermFactory().newNonce();
}
It exists only to make the Spi2Java generated code cleaner and easier to read.
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Output
The output process does not result in the binding of any variables, the semantics for the process
simply dictate that an output action must occur:
−
x! < M > .P x!<M>−→ P
Output is implemented by calling void Process.send(Channel c, Term m, Trace t). The first two method
parameters correspond to the Spi channel c and term M , i.e. they are f(c) and f(M) respectively.
The last parameter is for tracing purposes. It allows a Trace instance to be provided so that the data
being sent can be logged. The implementation of output action is just the single line code template
in figure 17.
send(Channel x, Term m, Trace t);
// Code implementing P...
Figure 17: Implementation of the output process x! < M > P .
Pair Splitting
The Spi pair splitting process, let (x, y) = M inP , is implemented by extracting the raw data from
the Java spp.Term instance corresponding to the Spi termM . The two terms, x and y, thatM is to
be split into are then unpacked from this data. To make it easier for the provider implementation to
pack and unpack terms from raw data, we introduce a restriction on creating and splitting pairs that
states that the first term must always be a name or name variable (i.e. it must be an atomic value).
This restriction means that when the provider code packs and unpacks terms to send and receive
over the communications network, it does not need to store extra information about the structure
of the pairs - which may be nested to arbitrary depth, e.g. the message {A,B,C} pub(A) would be
specified {(A, (B,C))} pub(A) given that A and B are names or name variables.
Apart from simplicity, this restriction has the advantage of making it possible to implement providers
that are message compatible with existing security protocol implementations, as such implementa-
tions are unlikely to use pairing to structure their message data.
The Java code template for this process is shown in figure 18, where TypeX and TypeY are the types
of the variables x and y respectively, and is is a temporary variable that is only in the scope of the
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block defined by the { and } characters on lines 4 and 10. Using a block allows the re-use of the
same temporary variable name for multiple instances of the code template. The alternative would
be for Spi2Java to generate a new temporary name each time it emits this code template, adding
unnecessary complexity to its implementation.
1
2 final TypeX x;
3 final TypeY y;
4 {
5 InputStream _is = new ByteArrayInputStream(j.getData());
6 x = getTermFactory().unpackTypeX(_is);
7 if (x == null) throw new AssignmentException("x", null);
8 y = getTermFactory().unpackTypeY(_is);
9 if (y == null) throw new AssignmentException("m", null);
10 }
11 // Code implementing P...
12
Figure 18: Implementation of the pair/tuple splitting process let (x, y) = M inP .
Decryption
The decryption process, caseL of {x}N inP , maps to a call to InputStream spi.Protocol.decrypt(spp.Encryption,
spp.Key). This call will propagate down to the byte[] spp.Key.decrypt(byte[]) method that is imple-
mented by the provider, according to encryption algorithm associated with the type of key i.e. either
symmetric, public or private.
final TypeX x = getImpl().unpackTypeX( decrypt(L, N));
if (x == null) throw new AssignmentException();
// Code implementing P...
Figure 19: Implementation of decryption.
Timestamp Validation
The timestamp validation process, case x valid inP , is implemented by the code template in figure
20, which is parameterised by the variable name x.
In this case a StuckException is thrown, to differentiate the reason for the process becoming stuck
from that of an assignment to a null value.
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if (!valid(x))
{
throw new StuckException();
}
// Code for P...
Figure 20: Implementation for timestamp validation case x valid inP
Match
The behaviour of the match process, [M isN ]P , is to progress as P provided the value of the terms
M and N is the same, otherwise the process is stuck. The implementation of the matching test,
is implemented by the SPP provider, which knows how to compare the concrete implementation of
message components. The boolean match(Term t) method on the sprite.spp.term.Term class, is defined
to return a boolean indicating whether or the parameter t matches the instance the method is being
called on. If the method returns false, i.e. the terms do not match, then the implementation must
exhibit the stuck process behaviour. The process is thus implemented in Java by statement to throw
an exception, implementing the stuck behaviour, guarded by an if statement that checks that the
components don’t match. Figure 21 lists the implementation of the process.
if (!x.match(n))
{
throw new StuckException();
}
// Code for P
Figure 21: Implementation for match [MisN ]P
6.5 Traceability
6.5.1 Compile Time Tracing
Spi2Java emits comments in the generated Java code, reflecting the Spi process actions that each Java
code segment implements. Apart from making the generated code easier to read and understand,
it allows each segment of generated code to be traced back to the original Spi specification. The
trace comments are emitted by the parsing rule for each Spi process action and term, and are also
concatenated to rebuild the original Spi process specification as a trace comment. This comment is
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emitted as documentation for the Java method that implements it, providing not only documentation
of the intended behaviour of the method, a but a compiler trace that can be validated against the
original specification.
6.5.2 Runtime Tracing
In addition to the Java code that implements the Spi actions, Spi2Java also emits code to trace the
protocol progress and state. This is done by making calls to a provider tracing implementation -
which can be a simple log file or user interface displaying the state of the protocol run as messages
are sent and received.
At the beginning of each generated method that implements a process definition A(X1, ..., Xi) = P ,
a sprite.spp.Trace instance is retrieved from the provider and the name of the current thread is set:
final Trace _trace = newTrace("A(X1, ..., Xi");
Thread.currentThread().setName("A(X1, ...,Xi");
This trace instance is used to trace both the progression of the protocol run in relation to Spi spec-
ification, and the variable bindings that have occurred. For example, Spi2Java emits the following
code for instantiating a new nonce n:
// (n)
_trace.traceSpi("(n)");
final Nonce n = newNonce();
if (n == null) throw new AssignmentException("n", null);
_trace.update("n", n);
In this example the first line is a Java comment indicating what Spi action is implemented by the
following code segment. The second line makes a call to the trace object to specify that the restriction
Spi action is about to executed. The code on the third line actually implements the action, and the
an assertion is made on the 4th line, while the final line calls the trace object to update the protocol
state with the value bound to the nonce n.
6.5.3 Stepping through a Process Run
The provider’s implementation of the sprite.spp.Trace may, optionally, allow the user to step through
a run of a protocol at the Spi process action granularity level.
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The Java code segments that implement each action, always make a call to sprite.spp.Trace.trace(String),
prior to executing the code that implements the action. Because the trace instance is supplied by
the provider, the provider implementation of the sprite.spp.Trace.trace(String) method can block
until it has received input from the user. Once the user response has been received, the call can
return and the run of the protocol can progress.
6.6 Implementation in Prolog
6.6.1 The Spi Lexer
Spi2Java lexer component defines a set of Prolog rules to implement a tokeniser that reads the plain
text input file and breaks it into valid tokens. The tokens consist of keywords and valid variable
identifiers and are compiled into a list that is passed to the parser component
6.6.2 Definite Clause Grammar
Spi2Java is implemented in SWI-Prolog using the Definite Clause Grammar (DCG) rules supported
by most Prolog engines [65]. The DCG provides syntactic sugar, allowing grammars to be specified
in a easier to read and more intuitive way. It allows parsing rules to specified without having to
explicitly declare a list of tokens in the rules’ parameters.
6.6.3 The Spi Parser
The Spi2Java parser component defines the Spi grammar using Prolog DCG rules in figure 22. This
figure omits the code generation body of the rules. The complete rules are available at [5].
The rules are declared with extra uninitialised parameters to which output data, i.e. generated code
and trace comments, can be bound to. The body of the rules defines a code segment template, into
which the relevant variable names are inserted. Figure 23 shows the rule defining the template for
restriction.
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/* (A)P */
process(InPre, OutCode, OutTrace) -->
[left_par], [var(A)], [colon], [var(Type)], [right_par],
process(InPre, PCode, PTrace),
{
type(Type),
strings_concat([’(’, A, ’)’], Trace),
strings_concat([Trace, ’\n\t\t// ’, PTrace], OutTrace),
strings_concat([InPre, ’_trace.trace("’, Trace, ’");\n’], PrintTrace),
strings_concat([InPre, ’_trace.update("’, A, ’", ’, A, ’);\n\n’], State),
strings_concat([InPre, ’// ’, Trace, ’\n’], Comment),
strings_concat([
Comment,
PrintTrace,
InPre, ’final ’, Type, ’ ’, A, ’ = new’, Type, ’();\n’,
InPre, ’if (’, A,
’ == null) throw new AssignmentException("’, A, ’", null);\n’,
State,
PCode],
OutCode)
}.
Figure 23: The DCG rule for parsing restriction and generating the implementing Java code.
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6.7 Implementation Correctness
Presuming the correctness of the Spi to Java mapping, the next concern is that the mappings
are correctly implemented by the Spi2Java code generator. This concern corresponds to the third
requirement identified by Whalen and Heimdahl for high integrity code generation is that “Rigorous
arguments must be provided to validate the translator and/or the generated code” [64, Page 4].
Using Prolog does not in and of itself provide a proof of correctness of the translator software
(Spi2Java) and hence meet this goal. However, given that in the development of Spi2Java the
specification of the mapping from Spi to Java was essentially defined using Prolog rules, we can be
confident (at least as much as our faith in the Prolog engine allows), that Spi2Java preserves those
mappings.
6.8 Example Implementation Using Spi2Java
In this section Spi2Java’s code generation abilities are demonstrated by way of example. Imple-
mentations of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol’s initiator and responder roles are generated.
The roles are specified as Spi processes and the specifications input into Spi2Java. The provider
implementation used is the type flaw detection one, that uses TCP/IP for network communications
and RSA, AES and SHA algorithms for asymmetric, symmetric and message digest cryptography
respectively. The resulting Java programs are run on separate machines, connected via a local area
network, and the output examined.
6.8.1 Implementing The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol
The legitimate roles of Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Public Authentication Protocol are specified as
the Spi processes Init,and Resp in figure 24.
Both the roles have process definition parameterised by a channel c. This channel represents an
endpoint for communication on a public network and thus may not be viewed as secure by the
principals. There is no guarantee that they are both instantiated with the same channel c when
they are executed. They could each be passed different channels, which may possessed by an attacker,
who would thus have control over their communications. We will elaborate further on modelling
an attacker in this manner in the next chapter, where we discuss the implementation of the flawed
Needham-Schroeder protocol and Lowe’s attack on it.
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Init(c:Channel, A:Identifier, B:Identifier) =
(n:Nonce)
c!<{(n, A)}pub(B)>.
c?(l:Encryption).
case l of {j:Pair}priv(A) in
let (x:Nonce, p:Pair) = j in
let (m:Nonce, y:Identifier) = p in
[x is n]
[y is B]
c!<{m}pub(B)>.
InitF(c, n, m)
Resp(c:Channel, B:Identifier) =
c?(l:Encryption).
case l of {j:Pair}priv(B) in
let (n:Nonce, A:Identifier) = j in
(m:Nonce)c!<{(n, (m, B))}pub(A)>.
c?(p:Encryption).
case p of {x:Nonce}priv(B) in
[x is m]
RespF(c, n, m)
abstract InitF(c:Channel, n:Nonce, m:Nonce)
abstract RespF(c:Channel, n:Nonce, m:Nonce)
Figure 24: Spi specification of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol initiator and responder roles.
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The specification demonstrates explicit pair splitting, as opposed to using the shorthand for tuples,
and also lists InitF and RespF , the user implementable abstract process definitions. These abstract
definitions provide a mechanism for the user integrate their code with the generated code. For
example, the user may wish to use the Spi2Java generated NSL implementation to establish a secure
session. Once the session has been established, the InitF and Resp implementations are run. They
are called with three parameters, the two secret nonces generated during the session - potentially
for use as a session key, and a handle to the shared channel for further communication.
6.9 Discussion
The evaluation of Spi2Java against the high integrity code generation requirements in section 2.3.1
is deferred to the results chapter. Briefly, requirements 1, 3 and 5 are largely met. Requirement 2 is
not completely met as the arguments we provide for the semantic consistency of the translation from
Spi constructs to Java code are not strictly formal. Requirement 5 is not met in any meaningful
sense, due to the limited resources available for exhaustive testing.
To put this in perspective, it is notable that formally verifying translator software is not, at least
currently, a completely attainable goal. Doing so would require a verified programming language in
which to implement the translator software, a verified compiler to compile the software to verifiable
machine code, making calls to verified libraries, with a verified operating system, all running on a
verified hardware architecture implementation [64, 10]
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Figure 25: Run of Spi2Java generated implementations of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe initiator
and responder roles on separate machines.
Chapter 7
Sprite
In this chapter we briefly describe our Security Protocol Implementation Tool and Environment
(SPrITE). The tool component is a simple graphical user interface for editing specifications and
running the Sn2Spi translator and Spi2Java code generator. The environment component consists
of an SPP provider that we have developed that, when used by Spi2Java generated security protocol
implementations, allows the user to simulate a run of a security protocol in a controlled environment.
This SPP provider exposes a graphical user interface that can be used to control the run of the
protocol simulation.
To illustrate the use of the Sprite environment, we simulate a run of the Needham-Schroeder Protocol.
The simulated run involves both the usual initiator and responder roles, as well as an attacker role
that executes Lowe’s attack on the protocol. The run is specified as a Spi Calculus process composed
of three parallel components, each of which specify one of the protocol roles. We describe how in a
protocol run specified in this manner, and simulated using Sprite, the attacker can have capabilities
of similar power as those of a Dolev- Yao style attacker.
7.1 Tool
The Sprite user interface provides a graphical menu to invoke either an editor, the Sn2Spi translator
or the Spi2Java code generator. The editor component provides text editing abilities to create and
edit standard notation and Spi specifications in plain text. Dialogue windows are provided when
invoking either Sn2Spi or Spi2Java, to select the input specification file and the output file, as shown
in figure 26.
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Figure 26: Using the Sprite UI to invoke Spi2Java.
7.1.1 Usability of Sprite
Sprite does not require the user to possess strong programming skills, nor experience implementing
security protocols. The user may employ Spi2Java generated code in their own program, and as such
should understand the security protocol being implemented, but they do not need to understand
the generated implementation code.
7.1.2 Implementation
The user interface is implemented in Java using the AWT and Swing APIs. It can be invoked from
command-line using the command java SpriteUI, provided the necessary Java classes are specified
by the CLASSPATH environment variable.
7.2 Environment
The Sprite environment employs an SPP provider developed to allow the user to run a controlled
simulation of a protocol. The provider displays a graphical user console for each Spi process that
specifies a protocol role, and each channel. The consoles allow the execution of the Spi processes
and the messages communicated over a channel to be controlled by user interaction.
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7.2.1 The Simulation Provider
The simulation SPP provider was briefly introduced in section 5.5.3; we describe it in more detail
in this section. Unlike the Standard and Typed Component SPP Providers, the Simulation SPP
Provider is not intended for real world deployment, but rather for simulating protocol runs in a
controlled environment.
Single Process, Multi-Threaded Execution
A simulated protocol run, using this provider, is executed as a single process on a single host. The
implementation of each protocol role - generated from a Spi process specification - is run in its own
thread within that process.
Spi2Java’s explicit implementation of the parallel composition process (P |Q) - as described in a
previous chapter - makes this possible. Spi2Java will emit Java code that spawns a new thread to
execute the implementation of P , while Q’s implementation will be executed by the existing thread.
Thus, if P and Q specify protocol roles they are executed by separate threads in the same process.
In contrast with this approach, when a “real world” SPP provider is used each protocol role’s
implementation is run in its own process and, probably, on a separate machines connected by a
network. In such cases Spi2Java’s explicit support for parallel composition is unnecessary: Parallel
composition is implemented implicitly, by virtue of each protocol role’s implementation running in
its own process.
Message Components
Because the message component values need to be easily recognizable by the user during a simulation
run, their sizes are reduced: Principal identifiers are a single byte - a single ASCII encoded character
- and nonces are also a single byte - a numeric value in the range 0 to 255.
Communication by Queue
Network communication is simulated by a simple queue data structure. Each pair of communicating
principals share an underlying queue. The queue is indirectly exposed to the principals via a concrete
instance of the sprite.spp.net.Channel interface. Protocol role implementations can thus send and
receive messages via the queue, using the channel abstraction.
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The queue implementation has thread safe methods to enqueue and dequeue messages, which are
accessed by the sprite.spp.net.Channel instance shared by the communicating principals. The queue
mechanism allows messages to be controlled, at runtime, by user interaction.
Cryptographic Implementation
The Simulation SPP Provider employs the same cryptographic algorithms used by the Standard
SPP Provider. Performance, in terms of user responsiveness, is increased by using short keys for
public key encryption.
Spi Process Control via User Interface
The Simulation Provider provides a console for each Spi process that specifies a given protocol. A
Spi Process Console allows the user to step through a Spi process at the granularity of individual
process actions by clicking on the step button. Alternatively, the user can run the process through
by clicking the run once.
Displaying Spi Process Information in the User Interface
The user interface console for each Spi process also contains two panes to display information about
the process. The first pane displays the progression of the Spi process. As each Spi action is
executed by the Spi2Java generated implementation, it is listed in this pane, along with the time of
its execution. The second pane displays state information pertaining to the Spi variables. Whenever
a binding action occurs, the name of the bound variable, and the value it was substituted with, is
displayed.
Controlling Messages via Channel User Interface
A Channel Console is also provided for each channel in the Spi process specification of the protocol.
The current message on the queue is displayed to the user as hexadecimal digits representing the
binary value of the message. The value can be modified by the user and then sent to the intended
recipient by pressing the Send Message button.
Like the Spi Process Console, the Channel Console has a run button that can be pressed once to
allow all messages to be delivered unmodified to their intended recipient.
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7.3 Run of the NS Protocol and Attack
In this section we demonstrate the Sprite environment by running a simulation of of a run of the
Needham Schroeder Public Key Authentication Protocol. In the run, shown in figure 27, we also
simulate an attacker using the attack discovered by Lowe in [39]. The inclusion of the attacker role in
the simulation - and the fact that it is successful in the simulated run - demonstrates that Spi2Java
does not, as expected, solve the problems inherent in a flawed security protocol specification. It also
show’s that Spi2Java can be used to implement Spi specifications of legitimate and attacker roles,
for the purposes of gaining insight into protocol behaviour, via simulation, and to demonstrate an
actual real world implementation of an attack.
The simulation is prepared by first using Spi2Java to generate code implementing the three Spi
processes that specify the initiator, responder roles and attacker roles. These three process are
composed in parallel, to form a single Spi process that specifies the protocol run. An implementation
of this parallel Spi process is also generated using Spi2Java.
The Spi2Java generated code is then used with the Simulation SPP Provider. The simulation can
be initiated by the user who can step through it action by action, allowing them to examine the
state of the simulation (as displayed in the user interface), at any given time.
Obviously the generated code can be used with any other SPP providers - such as the Typed
Component SPP Provider - to implement a real world attack. Such an implementation works
against implementations of the legitimate roles running on separate machines communicating over
a network.
1 A → B : {n, A}pub(B)
2 B → A : {n, m}pub(A)
3 A → B : {m}pub(B)
Figure 27: The Needham-Schroeder protocol.
7.3.1 Protocol and Attack Specification
Legitimate Roles
The legitimate roles of Needham-Schroeder protocol are specified as the Spi processes Init,and Resp
in figures 28 and 29 respectively.
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Init(c:Channel, A:Identifier, B:Identifier) =
(n:Nonce)
c!<{(n, A)}pub(B)>. (Msg 1)
c?(l:Encryption). (Msg 2)
case l of {j:Pair}priv(A) in
let (x:Nonce, m:Nonce) = j in
[x is n]
c!<{m}pub(B)>. (Msg 3)
nil
Figure 28: Spi specification of the initiator role of the Needham-Schroeder protocol.
Both the legitimate roles have process definitions parameterised by a channel c. This channel
represents an endpoint for communication on a public network and thus may not be viewed as
secure by the principals. There is no guarantee that messages sent on the channel will get to the
intended recipient.
Resp(c:Channel, B:Identifier) =
c?(l:Encryption). (Msg 1)
case l of {j:Pair}priv(B) in
let (n:Nonce, A:Identifier) = j in
(m:Nonce)
c!<{(n, m)}pub(A)>. (Msg 2)
c?(p:Encryption). (Msg 3)
case p of {x:Nonce}priv(B) in
[x is m]
nil
Figure 29: Spi specification of the responder role of the Needham-Schroeder protocol.
Lowe’s Attack
Lowe’s attack on the protocol is specified by the Spi process in figure 30. The attacker role’s Spi
process definition has two channel parameters, cA and cB. The former represents the channel for
communication with the initiator A, the latter with the responder B.
The attacker’s control of the network is modelled by defining a run of the attack as the Spi process
AttackRun in figure 31.
B can - unbeknownst to it - only communicate with A via C.
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Attack(cA:Channel, cB:Channel, B:Identifier, C:Identifier) =
cA?(l:Encryption). (Init’s Msg 1)
case l of {j:Pair}priv(C) in
let (n:Nonce, A:Identifier) = j in
cB!<{(n, A)}pub(B)>. (Resp’s Msg 1)
cB?(p:Encryption). (Resp’s Msg 2)
cA!<p>. (Init’s Msg 2)
cA?(k:Encryption). (Init’s Msg 3)
case k of {m:Pair}priv(C) in
cB!<{m}pub(B)>. (Resp’s Msg 3)
nil
Figure 30: Spi specification of Lowe’s attack role on the Needham-Schroeder protocol.
AttackRun(A:Identifier, B:Identifier, C:Identifier) =
(cAC)(cBC)(Init(cAC, A, B) | Resp(cBC, B) | Attack(cAC, cBC, A, B, C))
Figure 31: Spi specification for a run of the attack on the Needham-Schroeder protocol.
Dolev-Yao Attacker Capabilities
An attacker, specified in the manner of figure 31 - where well-intentioned principals A and B share
channels cAC and cCB with a potential attacker C, but not with each other - has the power to:
1. Pass on messages unmodified, for example: Messages received from A on cAC can be passed
on to B by sending them, as is, on cCB,
2. Remove messages: a message received on from A on cAC can just not be sent on cCB.
3. Introduce new messages by constructing it and sending it on either cAC or cCB.
4. Modify a message: a message received on cAC can be changed and then send on cCB.
5. Be a legitimate participant in a protocol run.
Given these powers, the Attack process has the capabilities of a Dolev-Yao style attacker [24].The
first, third and last abilities are demonstrated in this example. C participates as itself in the respon-
der role, with A as the initiator, in legitimate run of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. However,
C also masquerades as A, in the initiator role in a second subverted run. In the subverted run, C
reuses a message from the first run with A, and sends it to B and visa-versa to achieve its goal.
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7.3.2 Successful Attack Run
The results of a successful run of this attack are shown in figure 32. This screen-shot shows output
from a completed protocol run by Spi2Java generated implementations of the initiator, attacker and
responder roles. The three console windows display the state of the run from the perspectives of the
initiator (ALICE), attacker (EVE) and responder (BOB) respectively.
The bottom pane of the each output window lists the variable bindings for the role that have
occurred during the run. A comparison of the values of the variables m and n in the initiator,
attacker and responder’s output, reveals that the attacker has the same values for these nonces as
the two legitimate principals. Furthermore, as the runs for initiator and responder have completed
successfully, the responder BOB is, according to the protocol, entitled to believe that he has just
completed a successful run of the protocol with ALICE, and hence that m and n are secrets shared
between the two. Clearly this is not the case: EVE also possesses the values.
7.3.3 Lowe’s Fix
Lowe suggested an amended version of the protocol that corrects this problem [40]. By including
the identifier of the responder in the second message, an attacker can no longer send the message
unmodified to the initiator. Modifying the message to replace the real responder’s ID is not possible,
as the attacker does not possess the initiator’s private key, and can thus not decrypt the message.
The updated protocol is specified, informally, in figure 5 in a previous chapter.
The Spi specification for the initiator role is updated so that when the second message is received,
the extra component - the responder’s identifier - is unpacked and compared against the principal
identifier sent in the first message. The responder role is simply updated by appending the respon-
der’s identifier to the second message. The Spi specification for the initiator and responder roles of
this protocol, and a screen-shot of a run, appear in figures 7 and 25 respectively.
The Spi process specifying the ammended initiator role will halt when it compares the identifier
B in message two, with the expected value (EVE), and see’s that they do not match. Thus the
attempted attack is thwarted.
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Figure 32: Run of Lowe’s attack on the Needham-Schroeder protocol using the Sprite simulation
environment.
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7.4 Discussion
Sprite allows protocol runs to be simulated and controlled and their state observed, assisting in the
understanding of a given security protocol. By stepping through simulation, and possibly modifying
messages during the simulation, the Sprite user can gain insight into the protocol and possibly its
weaknesses.
In describing the Spi specification for our chosen example simulation, we have shown that an attacker
specified in this manner, and simulated using Sprite, has the idealised Dolev-Yao attacker capabil-
ities. This is useful because as this model, or one’s of similar power, are used by many security
protocol analysis methodologies, theoretical attacks discovered during analysis can be demonstrated
in a Sprite simulation.
Chapter 8
Results
In this chapter we describe a case study comparing manual security implementation against auto-
mated implementation using Sprite, evaluate Spi2Java against the requirements for high-integrity
code generation, discuss the classes of attacks address by Spi2Java and compare Spi2Java to existing
and current work in security protocol code generation.
8.1 Case Study: Manual vs. Automated Implementation
This section describes a case study in which we compared manually coded implementations of a
real world network security protocol, against an implementation automatically generated by Sprite.
The purpose of the case study was to evaluate how using automatic code generation mitigates the
introduction of errors during implementation.
The three message protocol in the CCITT recommendations for the X.509 standard was chosen.
Twenty-two pairs of fourth year computer science students were set a practical exercise to implement
it. Their resulting implementations were evaluated, along with the automatically generated Sprite
implementation, against a set of criteria and the results compared.
8.1.1 The Three Message CCITT X.509 Protocol
This protocol was selected because although its security properties are not very different from some
simpler, theoretical protocols such as NSL, the increased complexity of its message format and
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the number of checks and verifications that need to be performed, more accurately reflect security
protocols deployed in the real world. The protocol is defined informally by the message flow in figure
33.
1 A → B : A, {Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Y a}pub(B)}priv(A)
2 B → A : B, {Tb, Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Y b}pub(A)}priv(B)
3 A → B : A {Nb}priv(A)
Figure 33: The Three Message CCITT X.509 Protocol
A practical version, where a only hash of the message components is signed in preference to the
components themselves, has also been specified as shown in figure 34. The second version was used
in this study, as - depending on the key length - implementations of public key algorithms such as
RSA can only encrypt blocks of data of limited length. By using a hash, only 20 bytes of data (in
the case of the SHA hash algorithm) need to be encrypted to create the signature.
1 A → B : A, Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Y a}pub(B), {h(Ta, Na, B, Xa, {Y a}pub(B))}priv(A)
2 B → A : B, Tb, Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Y b}pub(A), {h(Tb, Nb, A, Na, Xb, {Y b}pub(A))}priv(B)
3 A → B : A {Nb}priv(A)
Figure 34: A more practical specification of the Three Message CCITT X.509 Protocol
This three message protocol has the security properties necessary to meet the following criteria as
they appear in [58]:
“The protocol must ensure the confidentiality of Y a and Y b: if A and B follow the
protocol, then an attacker should not be able to obtain Y a or Y b.” [58]
“The protocol must ensure the recipient B of the message 1 that the data Xa and Y a
originate from A” [58]
“The protocol must ensure the recipient A of the message 2 that the data Xb and Y b
originate from B” [58]
Currently there are no known attacks against a correct implementation. However, there is a potential
attack, described in [45], that is effective if the responder (i.e. principal B) does not verify the
timestamp Ta in message 1.
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8.1.2 Manual Implementations
The manual implementations were hand-ins from a practical exercise that was set for fourth year
computer science students enrolled in a network and internetwork security course in the Department
of Computer Science at the University of Cape Town. Given that this was the first course on network
security they had attended, the students fulfilled the role of being programmers with little or no
experience in implementing network security protocols - though they otherwise may have a fair
amount of programming experience. The exercise required that the students implement both the
initiator and responder roles of this three message protocol, from the standard notation specification.
The exact format of the message fields was also specified: fixed length fields were defined for atomic
message components, such as nonces, principal identifiers and timestamps; variable length fields,
preceded by length indicators, were defined for compound components such as cipher texts and
complete messages.
Students were encouraged to implement the protocol using the Java language: to benefit from its
simplicity, memory management and well defined libraries for network communication and cryptog-
raphy. However, they did not have the benefit of an API such as SPP, that provides functionality
to instantiate, serialise and deserialise messages and message components, hides the details of cryp-
tographic operations and abstracts network communication.
The main object of the practical was not to test the students general programming skills - al-
though this was a side effect, but rather to test their interpretation of the protocol specification and
understanding of the checks and verification steps required to implement the protocol correctly -
maintaining its intended security properties.
8.1.3 Evaluation Criteria
We drew up a table of the actions the protocol implementations must perform in order to correctly
implement the protocol behaviour. These actions included:
• Comparing received message components against corresponding values already in the princi-
pal’s possession - i.e. checking nonces and identifiers,
• validating timestamps,
• generating fresh values for nonces and timestamps,
• correctly encrypting and decrypting the relevant message components and
• verifying signatures and message digests.
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8.1.4 Evaluation of Manual Implementations
Only 9 of the 22 implementations of the initiator role did not miss any of the actions necessary to
achieve the desired security properties of the protocol. Of the 13 flawed implementations: 3 did not
verify that the nonce Na received in message 2 matched the nonce Na sent in message 1; 3 did not
verify both the identifiers A and B in message 2; 5 did not verify the timestamp received in message
2 at all and 3 implementations didn’t verify the timestamp correctly. The implementations of the
responder role had comparable error rates and characteristics.
8.1.5 Automated Implementation Using Sprite
To automatically generate an implementation using Sprite, the protocol was first specified in a
standard notation format suitable for input to Sn2Spi (see figure 35). Sn2Spi was run with this
input to generate a Spi specification for the initiator, A and responder, B, roles of the protocol as
shown in figure 36. This Spi specification was used as input to Spi2Java to produce the protocol
implementation listed in appendix A.
Principals A, B
Channel cAB
Identifier A, B
Nonce Na, Nb, Ya, Yb
Timestamp Ta, Tb
UserData Ua, Ub
Possession A:cAB
Possession A:A
Possession A:B
Possession A:Ua
Possession B:cAB
Possession B:B
Possession B:Ub
A -> B: A, Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B), {hash(Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B))}priv(A)
B -> A: B, Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A), {hash(Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A))}priv(B)
A -> B: A, {Nb}priv(A)
Figure 35: The Three Message CCITT X509 Protocol specified as input for Sn2Spi.
The Spi2Java generated X509 implementation was used with the Standard SPP Provider, that uses
the same message format as the manual implementations. A run of the initiator and responder roles
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A(A:Identifier, Ua:UserData, cAB:Channel, B:Identifier) =
(Ta:Timestamp)
(Na:Nonce)
(Ya:Nonce)
cAB!<A, Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B), {hash(Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B))}priv(A)>.
cAB?(tmp0:Pair).
let (tmp1:Identifier, Tb:Timestamp, Nb:Nonce, tmp2:Identifier, tmp3:Nonce,
Ub:UserData, tmp4:Encryption, tmp6:Encryption) = tmp0 in
case tmp4 of {Yb:Nonce}priv(A) in
case tmp6 of {tmp5:Hash}pub(B) in
[tmp1 is B]
case Tb is valid in
[tmp2 is A]
[tmp3 is Na]
[tmp5 is hash(Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A))]
cAB!<A, {Nb}priv(A)>.
nil
B(Ub:UserData, cAB:Channel, B:Identifier) =
cAB?(tmp0:Pair).
let (A:Identifier, Ta:Timestamp, Na:Nonce, tmp1:Identifier,
Ua:UserData, tmp2:Encryption, tmp4:Encryption) = tmp0 in
case tmp2 of {Ya:Nonce}priv(B) in
case tmp4 of {tmp3:Hash}pub(A) in
case Ta is valid in
[tmp1 is B]
[tmp3 is hash(Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B))]
(Tb:Timestamp)
(Nb:Nonce)
(Yb:Nonce)
cAB!<B, Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A),
{hash(Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A))}priv(B)>.
cAB?(tmp5:Pair).
let (tmp6:Identifier, tmp8:Encryption) = tmp5 in
case tmp8 of {tmp7:Nonce}pub(A) in
[tmp6 is A]
[tmp7 is Nb]
nil
Figure 36: Sn2Spi translation of the Three Message CCITT X.509 Protocol.
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of the implementation is shown in figure 37.
8.1.6 Evaluation of Sprite Generated Implementation
The Sprite generated implementation was evaluated in the same manner as the manual implemen-
tations. It was found to be correct with regard to the evaluation criteria, i.e. Sn2Spi translated
the standard notation specification to Spi processes that performed all the necessary actions, and
Spi2Java emitted code to implement all those actions.
8.1.7 Discussion
The Three Message CCITT X.509 Authentication Protocol, is an example of a real world protocol
that may be implemented and deployed in a production environment. In this case, the Sn2Spi
and Spi2Java components of Sprite, demonstrate that, used together, they can generate a correct
implementation of the protocol from an informal standard notation specification. This implies that,
at least for this protocol, Sn2Spi applies the correct rules for formalising the standard notation
specification in terms of Spi. Furthermore, Spi2Java correctly implements the protocol actions. The
only caveat, which applies more broadly to the use of Sprite, is the correctness of the cryptographic
operations as implemented by the SPP provider used. In this study the Standard SPP Provider,
which uses the JCE to implement RSA and AES encryption and SHA for message digest, was used.
Given the wide use of the JCE and its open nature, we can be reasonably confident that these
operations are implemented correctly.
The results of the comparison of manual and Sprite implementations, suggests that an inexperienced
protocol developer, can take a security protocol specification and use Sprite to generate an imple-
mentation in which we can have more confidence than one coded by themselves. There are obvious
limitations to drawing conclusions from this case study: experienced professional programmers are
arguably more thorough and have the time and resources to develop suitable test cases which may
catch many of the errors seen in the manual implementations. Nevertheless, as discussed in the in-
troduction to this work the discovery of flaws in widely deployed security protocol implementations,
both commercial and open source, is a regular occurrence.
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8.2 Evaluation of Spi2Java
In this section we evaluate Spi2Java against the Whalen et al’s [64] requirements for integrity code
generation introduced in the background chapter.
8.2.1 Requirement 1: Formally Defined Source and Target Languages
Both the source language, Spi, and the target language, Java, have formally defined semantics.
8.2.2 Requirement 2: Semantic Preserving Translation
We have defined a translation from Spi constructs to Java code segments and have provided detailed
arguments for the translations, though they are not strictly formal or rigorous as would be ideal.
Thus Spi2Java does not entirely meet this requirement. However, given that each Spi Calculus
language construct is translated to a simple and concise Java code segment, the user can inspect
them to satisfy themselves of their correctness, or review the mapping definitions and our supporting
arguments, provided in section 6.4.4.
8.2.3 Requirement 3: Validated Translator
The third requirement states that either the translation implementation, in this case Spi2Java, is
validated or the generated code is verified. We focus on the former: It is more efficient to verify
the translation definition and the implementation of the translation once, than to validate the code
generated by every run of the translator. We have used Prolog to implement the translation rules.
The Prolog rules that implement the translation are very close to the logical rules that specify it,
providing a high level of confidence in the implementation. As discussed previously, this is not an
absolute guarantee of correctness - given the distance of Prolog code from the physical machine -
but is as close as can be reasonably expected.
8.2.4 Requirement 4: Rigorously Tested Translator
This requirement has arguably not been met to a degree sufficient for production software. Spi2Java
has been used to implement a number of security protocols (some of theoretical interest, such as
the Needham-Schroeder protocol, and some of that reflect real world protocols, such as the Three
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Message X.509 protocol). Although these implementations have been manually inspected them for
correctness, this does not qualify as rigorous testing, nor does it provide complete coverage of the
code that implements Spi2Java
8.2.5 Requirement 5: Structured, Documented and Traceable Generated
Code
Determining whether or not code is well structured is a somewhat subjective exercise. Spi2Java emits
code that is structured for clarity and ease of understanding. The Spi process for each protocol role is
implemented in a single instance method. These methods are preceded by a comment documenting
the Spi process that they implement.
The code within the methods is clearly partitioned into segments implementing each process action.
Each such code segment is preceded by a comment, indicating corresponding Spi action in the
specification that it implements. This allows the generated code to be traced back to the Spi
specification at a very fine level of granularity. Conversely, the code segment that implements a Spi
action in the specification can easily located in the generated code. This traceability facilitates the
manual verification of Spi2Java implementations by inspection.
Further to meeting the traceability requirement, the comments emitted in the Spi2Java generated
code are mirrored in trace calls in the generated code. This allows the progress of the Spi processes
the specify the implementation, to be tracked by the user as the implementation runs. It also allows
the state of the Spi variables to displayed to the user. Finally it provides mechanism for the user to
control the progress of the implementation run, a feature used by the Simulation SPP Provider to
allow the user to step through a run of a protocol as described in section 7.2.1.
8.3 Classes of Attack Addressed
This section discusses classes of attacks and the properties of Spi2Java and SPP that serve to
minimise the vulnerability of Spi2Java generated implementations to these attack classes.
8.3.1 Protocol Logic Attacks
Attacks that exploit flaws in protocol specifications, where the logic of the protocol does not achieve
the intended security goals under certain conditions, are largely mitigated by the fact that protocols
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must be specified in Spi for input into Spi2Java. As discussed previously, the Spi formalism can be
used with a number of techniques and tools to verify the correctness of the protocol specification.
While this does not prevent Spi2Java from being used to generate implementations from flawed
protocol specifications, as demonstrated in section 7.3, it does provide the diligent security protocol
developer the opportunity verify the protocol specification prior to implementation.
8.3.2 Protocol Logic Implementation Attacks
Given that the protocol specification is correct, there is still the possibility of the implementation
failing to follow the specification faithfully. With Spi2Java, individual Spi actions are mapped to Java
code segments that preserve their semantics. Spi2Java is implemented by simple Prolog rules that
specify exactly that mapping. During the code generation process, Spi2Java emits trace comments
that allow each emitted Java code segments to be traced back to the corresponding Spi action that
it implements in the originating specification. We can thus have a high level of confidence in the
correctness of the mapping from Spi to Java, the implementation of that mapping, and hence the
protocol implementations generated using Spi2Java.
8.3.3 Type Flaw Attacks
The Typed Component SPP provider implements a tagging scheme similar to that proposed in [30]
- which has been shown to negate the risk of type flaw attacks that may be perpetrated by fooling
the protocol implementation into interpreting a message component of one type, as a component of
another type.
8.3.4 Buffer Overflow Attacks
Buffer overflow attacks are a specific instance of the general class of attacks that allow an attacker
to execute arbitrary code on a machine by getting the instruction pointer to point to an area of
memory that has been suitably modified. Buffer overflow exploits are, however, by far the most
common form of this class of attack. They are generally implemented by exploiting code written in
C, or C++, that uses unsafe string manipulation routines operating on null terminated byte array
in memory. Because these functions do not allow the length of the arrays being operated to be
specified up front, they allow memory that does not below to the array to be modified.
Newer, managed, languages, such as Java and C#, avoid this problem by using arrays with built in
bounds checking. These data structures contain information about their length, as well as code to
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ensure that memory that does not belong to the array is not accessed when the array is referenced.
By using Java as the target language, Spi2Java generated protocol implementations are not generally
vulnerable to this class of attack. There is always the possibility that the implementation of the
Java Virtual Machine the protocol implementation is running on, may have vulnerabilities of this
type. However, exploiting them would be a very complex task, and successful exploits are only likely
to work on a specific JVM implementation.
Another potential, though very impractical attack on managed languages such as Java, relies on
exploiting randomly flipped bits - a result of cosmic rays or hardware defects, in physical system
memory [29].This attack involves the creation of elaborate, inter-referencing data structures, de-
signed in such a way as to maximise the chance that if any bit is flipped, a variable will end up
pointing to an object of an incompatible type - thus subverting the Java type system.
8.3.5 Summary of Sprite’s Attack Class Coverage
Sprite and its component parts - Sn2Spi, SPP and Spi2Java - advances security protocol implementa-
tion through a structured approach that directly addresses three (i.e. Protocol Logic Implementation,
Type Flaw and Buffer Overflow attacks) of the four attack classes and, in conjunction with security
protocol analysis, addresses the class of attacks based on flawed security protocol specifications.
8.4 Comparison with Existing and Current Work
A number of difficulties are apparent when attempting to compare, Sprite (specifically the Spi2Java
component) to other code generation tools for security protocols. With the exception of COSP-J none
the other tools are actually available for download and use. Few have any associated publications
detailing the definition of the translation from specification language to implementation language
and the implementation of that translation definition. None of them have documentation relating
the semantics of the specification language constructs to those of the generated code.
8.4.1 COSP-J
COSP-J is the best documented with regard to its implementation. It is partly based on code
from Casper[40] - Lowe’s translation tool that has been very successfully used to translate informal
specifications to CSP for automated analysis [23]. Casper has produced successful results [39], which
should inspire confidence in the implementation of the translation.
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8.4.2 Another Spi2Java
After the completion of the implementation of our Spi2Java tool and submission for publication
of a paper summarising this work [6], we came across another tool [18], with the same name, and
purpose. A short publication describing this tool is available, but doesn’t describe the translation
implementation nor define the mapping from specification language to implementation code.
8.4.3 CAPSL
The approach to code generation from CAPSL involves generating Java classes that represent CIL
(the CAPSL intermediate language) constructs in a parse tree data structure that represents the
protocol [50]. The Java objects in the data structure are able to generate code, implementing the CIL
construct that they represent. While there is no emphasis on a formal methods for code generation,
this approach clearly links the source specification in CIL to the generated Java code that implements
the protocol. However, the CIL specification has to be generated via translation from CAPSL, as
CIL is not easily usable by the security protocol engineer. Thus there are two translation or code
generation processes that have to be undertaken to get from the source specification in CAPSL to
the implementation in Java.
The CAPSL code generation approach’s two phases allow Java code that represents protocol logic
to be independent of the code that implements some of the actions and practicalities, like message
component type interpretation. This aspect is mirrored by Spi2Java generated code’s use of the
SPP API that allows protocol logic implementation to be separated from lower level implementation
concerns.
The CAPSL approach has some limitations:
1. The generated code is not suitable for application use; it is intended to run in a demonstration
environment that is part of the work described in [50].
2. Public key encryption is not implemented as it was not available in the JCE provider employed.
3. The use of specific encryption algorithms is entrenched in the key objects, making it difficult
to change these algorithms.
The first and second limitations are reasonably easily addressed by firstly modifying the generated
code to make it suitable for application use, and secondly using an updated JCE provider that
implements RSA public key encryption. The final limitation is obviously not as easily rectified.
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This limitation is not encountered by Sprite, as Spi2Java generated code uses the SPP API that
abstracts the details of the encryption algorithms as well message component type interpretation
and network operations.
Some of the suggestions that the authors of [50] make for future extensions to their work are:
1. providing a choice of cryptographic algorithms,
2. generating code for application use and
3. adding functionality to the demonstration environment to allow the protocol messages to be
modified.
These suggested extensions have been largely implemented by Sprite. The first via the use of the
SPP API. The second is implemented by default by Spi2Java which generates code for application
use, but also allows a simulation SPP provider to be used to provide a simulation environment that
parallels CAPSL’s demonstration environment. The third extension is implemented to some degree
by Sprite’s simulation environment that allows the user to inspect and modify protocol messages,
though not in as user friendly a fashion as suggested by the authors of[50], who suggest that individual
message components could be saved by the user and used to synthesise new messages. Sprite only
provides access to a binary representation of the message, which the user can manually deconstruct
into message components, modify and use to construct new messages.
8.4.4 χ-Spaces
χ-Spaces is a programming language that is a concrete version of SPL [6]. As such, the specification
is the implementation. However, the publications describing χ-Spaces do not cover the compilation
process from χ-Spaces to the implementation language - Java. It is thus currently not possible to
evaluate this work.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
9.1 Meeting the Objectives
In the introduction we defined the objective of our work in terms of the following requirements:
1. It must have the ability to automatically translate informal to formal specifications,
2. be able to automatically generate security protocol implementations from formal specifications
and provide a high level of confidence in those implementations and
3. must realise a well defined methodology and tools for security protocol implementation, which
are easily usable by the security protocol engineer.
The first requirement is met by Sn2Spi, which converts informal specifications, in our well defined
version of the standard notation, to formal Spi Calculus specifications. The second, and key require-
ment, is achieved by Spi2Java’s ability to automatically generate security protocol implementations
from Spi Calculus specifications. Thus Sprite can generate implementations from both informal and
formal security protocol specifications.
We evaluated Spi2Java against the requirements for high integrity code generation. Spi2Java fully
meets three of these requirements, partially meets one of the requirements but does not meet the
rigorous testing requirement due to resource constraints. Although a complete formal proof of the
correctness of the Spi2Java mapping from Spi Calculus to Java code is not provided, as we have
followed the requirements for high integrity code generation where feasible, the Spi2Java user should
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be confident in the correctness of the generated code. Thus the second objective is largely, though
not entirely met.
Sn2Spi and Spi2Java both provide simple command line interfaces. The SPP API provides a clean,
simple interface to network and cryptographic operations. Sprite meets the objective of being easily
usable by the security protocol engineer by providing a graphical user interface to the Sn2Spi and
Spi2Java tools.
Though the implementation aspect of the development process is well defined in Sprite, through the
use of Sn2Spi and Spi2Java, the security protocol analysis process is not. As mentioned from the
outset, security protocol analysis is outside the scope of this work, but is nevertheless a comple-
mentary activity. The example presented in section 7.3, explicitly demonstrates that if the protocol
specification is flawed, the errors will be propagated to the generated code.
An automated interface to a model checker, such as MMC, or multi-dimensional analysis environment
such as SPEAR II should be considered as part of future work to fully meet this requirement.
9.2 Limitations and Future Work
The primary limitations, and areas for future extension, of this work are:
1. the lack of seamless integration with an analysis tool, such as SPEAR II or the MMC model
checker, and
2. the correctness of the cryptographic operations, and the interface to them, implemented by
the SPP API and conforming providers.
The first limitation can be addressed by future implementation work. Integration with the MMC
model checker would be the most desirable approach. By making the necessary modifications to
the syntax of the Spi Calculus generated by Sn2Spi, informal specification could be automatically
translated and then partly automatically verified by forwarding the Sn2Spi output to MMC.
Tackling the second limitation, which was discussed initially when describing the scope of the work,
requires further research as well as implementation. A possible approach would be to follow the
work of Backes et al in [44]. They develop an idealised cryptographic library - that can be used
like that Dolev-Yao cryptographic model - and a real library that conforms to the idealised one.
However, there may still be a way to go before being able to show, in an acceptably formal manner,
that a concrete Java implementation conforms to a formal cryptographic model such as Dolev-Yao.
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Other limitations of this work are covered in Sections 8.2 and 9.1, where Spi2Java is evaluated, and
we discuss how Sprite meets the objectives set out in the introduction, respectively.
9.3 Contributions
Sn2Spi provides an automated tool to convert informal security protocol specifications to Spi Calcu-
lus processes. The resulting Spi Calculus processes can then be subjected to all the formal method-
ologies that have been developed for analysing, verifying and reasoning about security protocols
specified in Spi. To our knowledge no other tool that fulfills this role exists.
Spi2Java is one of a handful of code generators for security protocols. Although we have since
discovered that it is no longer unique in function, or name, [18], when we started developing it
there was no other published research covering such work. However, unlike other code generators for
security protocols, with the exception of COSP-J, we have described in detail not only the mapping
from the formal specification language to implementation code, but also the implementation in
Prolog of that translation and published a summary of our approach in [6].
Some degree of isolation of the security protocol logic from the cryptographic algorithm implemen-
tations is evident in other code generators [23, 18]. Our SPP API clearly defines this separation and
extends it to network communications, by defining a distinct interface for these operations. The
API is also suitable for use by other implementation methods.
The process of implementation, from either informal or formal specifications is facilitated by Sprite’s
user interface for invoking the Sn2Spi and Spi2Java tools. The generated code is suitably packaged
and its functionality clearly exposed and documented, for use by, and incorporation in, other Java
applications.
Finally, three distinct areas of work that have been addressed plus a fourth unifying dimension,
for which software artefacts have been produced, namely Sn2Spi, SPP API, Spi2Java and Sprite.
While each is makes an individual contribution, we contend that the combination of these tools,
when applied in the context of security protocol engineering (as described in section 2.1) realises the
structured approach to network security protocol implementation as sought by this work.
Appendix A
Spi2Java Generated X.509
Implementation
package protocol;
import java.io.*;
import sprite.spi.*;
import sprite.spp.*;
import sprite.spp.net.*;
import sprite.spp.term.*;
/**
* Generated by Sprite::Spi2Java on Thu Dec 30 16:56:14 2004.
* See http://people.cs.uct.ac.za/~btobler/sprite/ for more information.
*/
public class X509Gen extends sprite.spi.Process
{
public X509Gen(Provider provider)
{
super(provider);
}
// A(A, Ua, cAB, B) =
// (Ta)
// (Na)
// (Ya)
// cAB!<A, Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B), {hash(Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B))}priv(A)>.
// cAB?(tmp0).
// let (tmp1, Tb, Nb, tmp2, tmp3, Ub, tmp4, tmp6) = tmp0 in
// case tmp4 of {Yb}priv(A) in
// case tmp6 of {tmp5}pub(B) in
// [tmp1 is B]
// case Tb is valid in
// [tmp2 is A]
// [tmp3 is Na]
// [tmp5 is hash(Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A))]
// cAB!<A, {Nb}priv(A)>.
// nil
public void A(
final Identifier A,
final UserData Ua,
final Channel cAB,
final Identifier B)
{
final Trace _trace = newTrace("A(A, Ua, cAB, B)");
Thread.currentThread().setName("A(A, Ua, cAB, B)");
// (Ta)
_trace.trace("(Ta)");
final Timestamp Ta = newTimestamp();
if (Ta == null) throw new AssignmentException("Ta", null);
_trace.update("Ta", Ta);
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// (Na)
_trace.trace("(Na)");
final Nonce Na = newNonce();
if (Na == null) throw new AssignmentException("Na", null);
_trace.update("Na", Na);
// (Ya)
_trace.trace("(Ya)");
final Nonce Ya = newNonce();
if (Ya == null) throw new AssignmentException("Ya", null);
_trace.update("Ya", Ya);
// cAB!<A, Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B), {hash(Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B))}priv(A)>.
_trace.trace("cAB!<A, Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B), {hash(Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B))}priv(A)>.");
send(cAB, pair(A, pair(Ta, pair(Na, pair(B, pair(Ua, pair(encrypt(Ya,pub(B)),
encrypt(hash(pair(Ta,pair(Na,
pair(B, pair(Ua, encrypt(Ya, pub(B))))))), priv(A)))))))), _trace);
// cAB?(tmp0).
_trace.trace("cAB?(tmp0).");
final Pair tmp0 = getTermFactory().unpackPair(recv(cAB, _trace));
if (tmp0 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp0", null);
_trace.update("tmp0", tmp0);
// let (tmp1, Tb, Nb, tmp2, tmp3, Ub, tmp4, tmp6) = tmp0 in
_trace.trace("let (tmp1, Tb, Nb, tmp2, tmp3, Ub, tmp4, tmp6) = tmp0 in ");
final Identifier tmp1;
final Timestamp Tb;
final Nonce Nb;
final Identifier tmp2;
final Nonce tmp3;
final UserData Ub;
final Encryption tmp4;
final Encryption tmp6;
{
InputStream _is = new ByteArrayInputStream(tmp0.getData());
tmp1 = getTermFactory().unpackIdentifier(_is);
if (tmp1 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp1", null);
_trace.update("tmp1", tmp1);
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
Tb = getTermFactory().unpackTimestamp(_is);
if (Tb == null) throw new AssignmentException("Tb", null);
_trace.update("Tb", Tb);
}
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
Nb = getTermFactory().unpackNonce(_is);
if (Nb == null) throw new AssignmentException("Nb", null);
_trace.update("Nb", Nb);
}
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
tmp2 = getTermFactory().unpackIdentifier(_is);
if (tmp2 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp2", null);
_trace.update("tmp2", tmp2);
}
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
tmp3 = getTermFactory().unpackNonce(_is);
if (tmp3 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp3", null);
_trace.update("tmp3", tmp3);
}
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
Ub = getTermFactory().unpackUserData(_is);
if (Ub == null) throw new AssignmentException("Ub", null);
_trace.update("Ub", Ub);
}
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
107
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
tmp4 = getTermFactory().unpackEncryption(_is);
if (tmp4 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp4", null);
_trace.update("tmp4", tmp4);
}
tmp6 = getTermFactory().unpackEncryption(_is);
if (tmp6 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp6", null);
_trace.update("tmp6", tmp6);
}
// case tmp4 of {Yb}priv(A) in
_trace.trace("case tmp4 of {Yb}priv(A) in ");
final Nonce Yb = getTermFactory().unpackNonce(decrypt(tmp4, priv(A)));
if (Yb == null) throw new AssignmentException("Yb", null);
_trace.update("Yb", Yb);
// case tmp6 of {tmp5}pub(B) in
_trace.trace("case tmp6 of {tmp5}pub(B) in ");
final Hash tmp5 = getTermFactory().unpackHash(decrypt(tmp6, pub(B)));
if (tmp5 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp5", null);
_trace.update("tmp5", tmp5);
// [tmp1 is B]
_trace.trace("[tmp1 is B]");
if (!tmp1.match(B))
{
_trace.trace("MATCH FAILED: tmp1 != B.");
_trace.trace("Variable tmp1’s value is " + tmp1.toString());
_trace.trace("Variable B’s value is " + B.toString());
_trace.trace("PROCESS STUCK");
throw new StuckException("Match failed: tmp1 is not equal to B.");
}
// case Tb is valid in
_trace.trace("case Tb is valid in ");
if (!valid(Tb))
{
_trace.trace("TIMESTAMP EXPIRED: " + Tb);
_trace.trace("PROCESS STUCK");
throw new StuckException("Timestamp expired: Tb"); }
// [tmp2 is A]
_trace.trace("[tmp2 is A]");
if (!tmp2.match(A))
{
_trace.trace("MATCH FAILED: tmp2 != A.");
_trace.trace("Variable tmp2’s value is " + tmp2.toString());
_trace.trace("Variable A’s value is " + A.toString());
_trace.trace("PROCESS STUCK");
throw new StuckException("Match failed: tmp2 is not equal to A.");
}
// [tmp3 is Na]
_trace.trace("[tmp3 is Na]");
if (!tmp3.match(Na))
{
_trace.trace("MATCH FAILED: tmp3 != Na.");
_trace.trace("Variable tmp3’s value is " + tmp3.toString());
_trace.trace("Variable Na’s value is " + Na.toString());
_trace.trace("PROCESS STUCK");
throw new StuckException("Match failed: tmp3 is not equal to Na.");
}
// [tmp5 is hash(Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A))]
_trace.trace("[tmp5 is hash(Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A))]");
if (!tmp5.match(hash(pair(Tb, pair(Nb, pair(A, pair(Na, pair(Ub, encrypt(Yb, pub(A))))))))))
{
_trace.trace("MATCH FAILED: tmp5 != hash(pair(Tb, pair(Nb, pair(A, pair(Na, pair(Ub, encrypt(Yb, pub(A)))))))).");
_trace.trace("Variable tmp5’s value is " + tmp5.toString());
_trace.trace(
"Variable hash(pair(Tb, pair(Nb, pair(A, pair(Na, pair(Ub, encrypt(Yb, pub(A))))))))’s value is "
+ hash(pair(Tb, pair(Nb, pair(A, pair(Na, pair(Ub, encrypt(Yb, pub(A)))))))).toString());
_trace.trace("PROCESS STUCK");
throw new StuckException(
"Match failed: tmp5 is not equal to hash(pair(Tb, pair(Nb, pair(A, pair(Na, pair(Ub, encrypt(Yb, pub(A)))))))).");
}
// cAB!<A, {Nb}priv(A)>.
_trace.trace("cAB!<A, {Nb}priv(A)>.");
send(cAB, pair(A, encrypt(Nb, priv(A))), _trace);
// nil
_trace.trace("nil");
return;
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}
// B(Ub, cAB, B) =
// cAB?(tmp0).
// let (A, Ta, Na, tmp1, Ua, tmp2, tmp4) = tmp0 in
// case tmp2 of {Ya}priv(B) in
// case tmp4 of {tmp3}pub(A) in
// case Ta is valid in
// [tmp1 is B]
// [tmp3 is hash(Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B))]
// (Tb)
// (Nb)
// (Yb)
// cAB!<B, Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A), {hash(Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A))}priv(B)>.
// cAB?(tmp5).
// let (tmp6, tmp8) = tmp5 in
// case tmp8 of {tmp7}pub(A) in
// [tmp6 is A]
// [tmp7 is Nb]
// nil
public void B(
final UserData Ub,
final Channel cAB,
final Identifier B)
{
final Trace _trace = newTrace("B(Ub, cAB, B)");
Thread.currentThread().setName("B(Ub, cAB, B)");
// cAB?(tmp0).
_trace.trace("cAB?(tmp0).");
final Pair tmp0 = getTermFactory().unpackPair(recv(cAB, _trace));
if (tmp0 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp0", null);
_trace.update("tmp0", tmp0);
// let (A, Ta, Na, tmp1, Ua, tmp2, tmp4) = tmp0 in
_trace.trace("let (A, Ta, Na, tmp1, Ua, tmp2, tmp4) = tmp0 in ");
final Identifier A;
final Timestamp Ta;
final Nonce Na;
final Identifier tmp1;
final UserData Ua;
final Encryption tmp2;
final Encryption tmp4;
{
InputStream _is = new ByteArrayInputStream(tmp0.getData());
A = getTermFactory().unpackIdentifier(_is);
if (A == null) throw new AssignmentException("A", null);
_trace.update("A", A);
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
Ta = getTermFactory().unpackTimestamp(_is);
if (Ta == null) throw new AssignmentException("Ta", null);
_trace.update("Ta", Ta);
}
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
Na = getTermFactory().unpackNonce(_is);
if (Na == null) throw new AssignmentException("Na", null);
_trace.update("Na", Na);
}
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
tmp1 = getTermFactory().unpackIdentifier(_is);
if (tmp1 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp1", null);
_trace.update("tmp1", tmp1);
}
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
Ua = getTermFactory().unpackUserData(_is);
if (Ua == null) throw new AssignmentException("Ua", null);
_trace.update("Ua", Ua);
}
{
Pair _p = getTermFactory().unpackPair(_is);
_is = new ByteArrayInputStream(_p.getData());
if (_p == null) throw new AssignmentException("_p", null);
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tmp2 = getTermFactory().unpackEncryption(_is);
if (tmp2 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp2", null);
_trace.update("tmp2", tmp2);
}
tmp4 = getTermFactory().unpackEncryption(_is);
if (tmp4 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp4", null);
_trace.update("tmp4", tmp4);
}
// case tmp2 of {Ya}priv(B) in
_trace.trace("case tmp2 of {Ya}priv(B) in ");
final Nonce Ya = getTermFactory().unpackNonce(decrypt(tmp2, priv(B)));
if (Ya == null) throw new AssignmentException("Ya", null);
_trace.update("Ya", Ya);
// case tmp4 of {tmp3}pub(A) in
_trace.trace("case tmp4 of {tmp3}pub(A) in ");
final Hash tmp3 = getTermFactory().unpackHash(decrypt(tmp4, pub(A)));
if (tmp3 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp3", null);
_trace.update("tmp3", tmp3);
// case Ta is valid in
_trace.trace("case Ta is valid in ");
if (!valid(Ta))
{
_trace.trace("TIMESTAMP EXPIRED: " + Ta);
_trace.trace("PROCESS STUCK");
throw new StuckException("Timestamp expired: Ta"); }
// [tmp1 is B]
_trace.trace("[tmp1 is B]");
if (!tmp1.match(B))
{
_trace.trace("MATCH FAILED: tmp1 != B.");
_trace.trace("Variable tmp1’s value is " + tmp1.toString());
_trace.trace("Variable B’s value is " + B.toString());
_trace.trace("PROCESS STUCK");
throw new StuckException("Match failed: tmp1 is not equal to B.");
}
// [tmp3 is hash(Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B))]
_trace.trace("[tmp3 is hash(Ta, Na, B, Ua, {Ya}pub(B))]");
if (!tmp3.match(hash(pair(Ta, pair(Na, pair(B, pair(Ua, encrypt(Ya, pub(B)))))))))
{
_trace.trace("MATCH FAILED: tmp3 != hash(pair(Ta, pair(Na, pair(B, pair(Ua, encrypt(Ya, pub(B))))))).");
_trace.trace("Variable tmp3’s value is " + tmp3.toString());
_trace.trace("Variable hash(pair(Ta, pair(Na, pair(B, pair(Ua, encrypt(Ya, pub(B)))))))’s value is " + hash(pair(Ta, pair(Na, pair(B, pair(Ua, encrypt(Ya, pub(B))))))).toString());
_trace.trace("PROCESS STUCK");
throw new StuckException("Match failed: tmp3 is not equal to hash(pair(Ta, pair(Na, pair(B, pair(Ua, encrypt(Ya, pub(B))))))).");
}
// (Tb)
_trace.trace("(Tb)");
final Timestamp Tb = newTimestamp();
if (Tb == null) throw new AssignmentException("Tb", null);
_trace.update("Tb", Tb);
// (Nb)
_trace.trace("(Nb)");
final Nonce Nb = newNonce();
if (Nb == null) throw new AssignmentException("Nb", null);
_trace.update("Nb", Nb);
// (Yb)
_trace.trace("(Yb)");
final Nonce Yb = newNonce();
if (Yb == null) throw new AssignmentException("Yb", null);
_trace.update("Yb", Yb);
// cAB!<B, Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A), {hash(Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A))}priv(B)>.
_trace.trace("cAB!<B, Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A), {hash(Tb, Nb, A, Na, Ub, {Yb}pub(A))}priv(B)>.");
send(cAB, pair(B, pair(Tb, pair(Nb, pair(A, pair(Na,
pair(Ub, pair(encrypt(Yb, pub(A)), encrypt(hash(pair(Tb,
pair(Nb, pair(A, pair(Na, pair(Ub, encrypt(Yb, pub(A)))))))), priv(B))))))))), _trace);
// cAB?(tmp5).
_trace.trace("cAB?(tmp5).");
final Pair tmp5 = getTermFactory().unpackPair(recv(cAB, _trace));
if (tmp5 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp5", null);
_trace.update("tmp5", tmp5);
// let (tmp6, tmp8) = tmp5 in
_trace.trace("let (tmp6, tmp8) = tmp5 in ");
final Identifier tmp6;
final Encryption tmp8;
{
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InputStream _is = new ByteArrayInputStream(tmp5.getData());
tmp6 = getTermFactory().unpackIdentifier(_is);
if (tmp6 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp6", null);
tmp8 = getTermFactory().unpackEncryption(_is);
if (tmp8 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp8", null);
}
_trace.update("tmp6", tmp6);
_trace.update("tmp8", tmp8);
// case tmp8 of {tmp7}pub(A) in
_trace.trace("case tmp8 of {tmp7}pub(A) in ");
final Nonce tmp7 = getTermFactory().unpackNonce(decrypt(tmp8, pub(A)));
if (tmp7 == null) throw new AssignmentException("tmp7", null);
_trace.update("tmp7", tmp7);
// [tmp6 is A]
_trace.trace("[tmp6 is A]");
if (!tmp6.match(A))
{
_trace.trace("MATCH FAILED: tmp6 != A.");
_trace.trace("Variable tmp6’s value is " + tmp6.toString());
_trace.trace("Variable A’s value is " + A.toString());
_trace.trace("PROCESS STUCK");
throw new StuckException("Match failed: tmp6 is not equal to A.");
}
// [tmp7 is Nb]
_trace.trace("[tmp7 is Nb]");
if (!tmp7.match(Nb))
{
_trace.trace("MATCH FAILED: tmp7 != Nb.");
_trace.trace("Variable tmp7’s value is " + tmp7.toString());
_trace.trace("Variable Nb’s value is " + Nb.toString());
_trace.trace("PROCESS STUCK");
throw new StuckException("Match failed: tmp7 is not equal to Nb.");
}
// nil
_trace.trace("nil");
return;
}
}
Bibliography
[1] M. Abadi and A.D. Gordon. A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The Spi Calculus. Tech-
nical Report SRC Research Report 149, Digital Systems Research Centre, 1998.
[2] M. Abadi and R. Needham. Prudent engineering practice for cryptographic protocols. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, 22(1):6–15, 1996.
[3] Ana Cavalcanti and Augusto Sampaio. From CSP-OZ to Java with Processes. In IPDPS ’02:
Proceedings of the 16th International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, page 161.
IEEE Computer Society, 2002.
[4] Andrew Phillips and Susan Eisenbach and Daniel Lister. From Process Algebra to Java Code.
In FTfJP’02. http://www.cs.kun.nl/ erikpoll/ftfjp/2002.html, June 2002.
[5] Benjamin Tobler. Sprite Website. University of Cape Town,
http://people.cs.uct.ac.za/˜btobler/sprite/.
[6] Benjamin Tobler and Andrew Hutchison. Generating Network Security Protocol Implementa-
tions from Formal Specifications. In To Appear in Proceedings of CSES 2004 2nd International
Workshop on Certification and Security in Inter-Organizational E-Services. Kluwer, 2004.
[7] S. Berghofer and M. Strecker. Extracting a formally verified, fully executable compiler from a
proof assistant. In Proc. 2nd International Workshop on Compiler Optimization Meets Compiler
Verification (COCV’2003), Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, 2003. To appear.
[8] E. Borger and W. Schulte. A programmer friendly modular definition of the semantics of java.
In J. Alves-Foss, editor, Formal Syntax and Semantics of Java, volume 1523 of Lect. Notes in
Comp. Sci., pages 353–404. Springer-Verlag, 1999.
[9] S. Brackin, C. Meadows, and J. Millen. CAPSL interface for the NRL protocol analyzer. In 2nd
IEEE Workshop on Application-Specific Software Engineering and Technology (ASSET ’99).
IEEE Computer Society, 1999.
111
112 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[10] J. Bowen C.A.R. Hoare, H. Jifeng and P. Pandya. ESPRIT BRA 3104 ProCoS project: Provably
Correct Systems. Technical report, Oxford University Computing Laboratory, 1990.
[11] CERT. CERT Advisory CA-2003-26 Multiple Vulnerabilities in SSL/TLS Implementations.
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-26.html.
[12] CERT. Microsoft private communication technology (pct) fails to properly validate message
inputs. CERT, http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/586540.
[13] CERT. Vulnerability Note VU#104280 Multiple vulnerabilities in SSL/TLS implementations.
CERT, http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/104280.
[14] Christopher Colby and Radha Jagadeesan and Konstantin Laufer and Lalita Jategaonkar Ja-
gadeesan and Carlos Puchol. Design and Implementation of Triveni: a Process-algebraic API
for Threads + Events. In ICCL ’98: Proceedings of the 1998 International Conference on
Computer Languages, page 58. IEEE Computer Society, 1998.
[15] F. Crazzolara. Language, Semantics, and Methods for Security Protocols. PhD thesis, University
of Aarhus, 2003.
[16] F. Crazzolara and G. Winskel. Events in security protocols. In ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, pages 96–105, 2001.
[17] S. Crocker D. Eastlake and J. Schiller. Randomness Recommendations for Security, 1994.
[18] Riccardo Sisto Davide Pozza and Luca Durante. Spi2Java: Automatic Cryptographic Proto-
col Java Code Generation from spi calculus. In 18th International Conference on Advanced
Information Networking and Applications (AINA’04) Volume 1, page 400. IEEE, 2004.
[19] Adrian Perrig Dawn Xiaodong Song and Doantam Phan. AGVI - Automatic Generation,
Verification, and Implementation of Security Protocols. In Proceedings of the 13th International
Conference on Computer Aided Verification, pages 241–245. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[20] G. Denker. Design of a CIL connector to Maude. In N. Heintze H. Veith and E. Clarke, editors,
Workshop on Formal Methods and Comuter Security. Carnegie Mellon University, July 2000.
[21] G. Denker and J. Millen. CAPSL and CIL language design. Technical Report SRI-CSL-99-02,
SRI International Computer Science Laboratory, 1999.
[22] G. Denker and J. Millen. CAPSL integrated protocol environment, 2000.
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/denker00capsl.html.
[23] X. Didelot. COSP-J: A Compile for Security Protocols. Master’s thesis, University of Oxford.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 113
[24] D. Dolev and A.C. Yao. On the security of public key protocols. Technical Report STAN-CS-
81-854, Stanford University, 1981.
[25] S. Drossopoulou and S. Eisenbach. Towards and operations semantics and type soundness for
java.
[26] R. Johnson E. Gamma, R. Helm and J. Vlissides. Design Patterns. Addison-Wesley, 1994.
[27] H. Abelson et al. R5Rs Scheme Revised(5) Report on the Algorithmic Language Scheme, March
2001.
[28] FIPS. Derived Test Requirements [DTR] for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for
Cryptographic Modules, 2002. http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-2.htm.
[29] Sudhakar Govindavajhala and Andrew W. Appel. Using memory errors to attack a virtual
machine. In SP ’03: Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, page
154. IEEE Computer Society, 2003.
[30] James Heather, Gavin Lowe, and Steve Schneider. How to prevent type flaw attacks on secu-
rity protocols. In CSFW ’00: Proceedings of the 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Workshop (CSFW’00), page 255. IEEE Computer Society, 2000.
[31] D.C. Hyde. Introduction to the programming language Occam, 1995.
[32] D. Caromel I. Attali and M. Russo. A formal executable semantics for java.
[33] Ian Sommerville. Software Engineering (5th ed. Addison Wesley, Redwodd City, CA, USA,
1995.
[34] G. Steele J. Gosling, B. Joy and G. Bracha. The Java Language Specification. Addison-Wesley,
second edition, 2000.
[35] B. Jacobs and F. Piessens. A Pi-Calculus Semantics for Java: The Full Definition, 2003.
[36] KDE. KDE Security Advisory: KDE 2.2 / Konqueror Embedded SSL vulnerability.
http://www.kde.org/info/security/advisory-20030602-1.txt.
[37] R. Needham L. Gong and R. Yahalom. Reasoning about belief in cryptographic protocols. In
Deborah Cooper and Teresa Lunt, editors, Proceedings 1990 IEEE Symposium on Research in
Security and Privacy, pages 234–248. IEEE Computer Society, 1990.
[38] Leonardo Freitas. JACK: A process algebra implementation in Java. Master’s thesis, Centro de
Informatica, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, April 2002. http://www.cin.ufpe.br/ lf25.
[39] G. Lowe. An attack on the needham-schroeder public-key authentication protocol. Information
Processing Letters, 56(3):131–133, 1995.
114 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[40] G. Lowe. Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR. In Tools
and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS), volume 1055, pages
147–166. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Germany, 1996.
[41] M. Abadi M. Burrows and R. Needham. A logic of authentication, from proceedings of the
royal society, volume 426, number 1871, 1989. In William Stallings, Practical Cryptography for
Data Internetworks. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1996.
[42] Mario Caccamo, Federico Crazzolara and Giuseppe Milicia. χ-Spaces From a model to a working
language. Technical report, Aarhus University, 2002.
[43] S. McAlearney. Patches Issued for Multiple RADIUS Implementation Flaws.
http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/2002/mar/digest07.shtml.
[44] Birgit Pfitzmann Michael Backes and Michael Waidner. A composable cryptographic library
with nested operations (extend abstract), 2003. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/671432.html.
[45] Michael Burrows, Martin Abadi and Roger Needham. A logic of authentication. Technical
Report Technical Report 39, Digital Systems Research Center, February 1989.
[46] Michael Mo¨ller. Specifying and Checking Java using CSP. Technical report, Universita¨t Old-
enburg, 2002.
[47] MicheleBugliesi, Ricardo Forcardi and Matteo Maffei. Authenticity by tagging and typing. In
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering, pages
1–12, October 2004.
[48] J. Millen. nspk.cil. http://www.csl.sri.com/users/millen/capsl/jparse/nspk.cil.
[49] J. Millen. Prelimenary translator, CAPSL to CIL. http://www.csl.sri.com/users/millen/capsl/capsltrans.html.
[50] J. Millen and F. Muller. Cryptographic protocol generation from CAPSL. Technical Report
SRI-CSL-01-07, SRI International, December 2001.
[51] Robin Milner, Joachim Parrow, and David Walker. A calculus of mobile processes, Parts I and
II. Journal of Information and Computation, 100(1):1–40 and 41–77, 1992.
[52] C. Morgan. Programming from specifications (2nd ed.). Prentice Hall International (UK) Ltd.,
1998.
[53] L.C. Paulson. The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. Journal of Com-
puter Security, 6:85–128, 1998.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 115
[54] C. R. Ramakrishnan Ping Yang and Scott A. Smolka. A logical encoding of the pi-calculus:
Model checking mobile processes using tabled resolution. In Verification, Model Checking and
Abstract Interpretation (VMCAI), volume 2575 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
116–131, New York, NY, January 2003. Springer.
[55] E. Saul. Facilitating the Modelling and Automated Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols. Mas-
ter’s thesis, University of Cape Town, July 2001.
[56] B. Schneier. Cryptography: The importance of not being different, March 1999.
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9904.html.
[57] SGS-THOMSON Microelectronics Limited. Occam 2.1 reference manual, 1995.
[58] SPORE. CCITT X.509 (3). http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/spore/ccittx509 3.html.
[59] SUN. JavaTM 2 Platform, Standard Edition, v 1.4.2 API Specification.
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.4.2/docs/api/index.html.
[60] Sun. Java Cryptography Architecture API Specification & Reference, 2004.
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.4.2/docs/guide/security/CryptoSpec.html.
[61] J. Thayer, J. Herzog, and J. Guttman. Strand spaces: Proving security protocols correct.
Journal of Computer Security, 1999.
[62] D. von Oheimb and T. Nipkow. Machine-checking the Java specification: Proving type-safety.
In Jim Alves-Foss, editor, Formal Syntax and Semantics of Java, volume 1523 of LNCS, pages
119–156. Springer, 1999. http://isabelle.in.tum.de/Bali/papers/Springer98.html.
[63] D. Wagner and B. Schneier. Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol. http://www.schneier.com/paper-
ssl.html.
[64] M.W. Whalen and M.P.E. Heimdahl. On the requirements of high-integrity code generation. In
Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE High Assurance in Systems Engineering Workshop, November
1999.
[65] J. Wielemaker. SWI-Prolog 5.2.10 Reference Manual, 2003.
http://www.swi.psy.uva.nl/projects/SWI-Prolog/Manual/.
[66] A.F. Yasinsac. Evaluating Cryptographic Protocols. PhD thesis, University of Virginia, 1996.
